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ABSTRACT
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INTERORGANIZATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES IN CHANNEL RELATIONSHIPS
BY
JENNIFER LEIGH FRIES
April 2011

Committee Chair:

Dr. Daniel C. Bello

Major Academic Unit:

Marketing

Organizations are increasingly focusing on their value chain activities in an effort to
improve their performance, especially in the recent economic times. Improving the
effectiveness and efficiency of their channel activities has become a focal point for many
organizations. Interorganizational systems (IOS’s) have played an important part in this
effort. While in theory, IOS’s have the ability to enhance the degree of cooperation and
coordination between two channel partners, often the results obtained are not what is
expected. Hence, it becomes very important to understand the barriers to the assimilation
of these technologies. Drawing upon theoretical perspectives of governance, including
transaction cost analysis (TCA), control theory and agency theory, we develop an
integrative model that examines the factors that influence an organizations assimilation
process. The model identifies and examines three stages of assimilation: technological,
exploitive and explorative assimilation that add value to an organization. The model
features asset specificity, technological uncertainty, performance documentation, agent
orientation and bilateral governance mechanisms as antecedents to assimilation. It also
examines the moderating effects of bilateral mechanisms.
Our results suggest that theories of governance provide an additional lens to examine
assimilation phenomena. In specific, our empirical analysis leads to several key findings:
(1) channel partners who are locked in to the relationship with high levels of asset
specificity are more likely to assimilate the technology; (2) bilateral governance
mechanisms are a key force in the assimilation process, with both direct and moderated
effects; (3) organizations that view the channel partner as an agent of the firm are less
likely to adopt the technology, especially when the relationship exhibits low levels of
bilateral governance mechanisms. Together these findings provide new insights into
barriers to the assimilation of IOS’s in channel relationships.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Over the last four decades, interorganizational systems (IOS’s) have become increasingly
important in channel partner relationships. An IOS can be defined as an information technology
system that links two or more organization’s business processes together in such a way that
information is automatically distributed between channel partners (Grover 1993; Johnston and
Vitale 1988; Robey, Im and Wareham 2008). An IOS is designed to support collaboration and
cooperation between channel partners (Volkoff, Chan and Newson 1999). These systems
include hardware, software, network facilities, procedures, rules, databases and knowledge
exchange between two or more organizations (Hausman, Johnston and Oyedel 2005).

IOS’s enhance the degree of cooperation and coordination between two channel partners and
include such technologies as electronic data interchange (EDI), supply chain management
systems, electronic commerce and most recently Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
technologies (Curtin, Kauffman and Riggins 2007). These technologies are often mandated by
one channel partner, who makes the adoption of the technology a mandatory requirement for
their channel partner to continue the exchange relationship. While power plays a significant role
in channel partner IOS, it is not the holy grail, as Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer, has
learned from its faltering RFID-based IOS mandates that began in 2003. Although the RFID
mandates have not progressed as originally planned, the importance of these systems is
highlighted by Wal-Mart’s recent strategy to increase its direct-from-manufacturer purchases
from 20% to 80% of all goods purchased (Birchall 2010), which emphasizes the need for
efficient supply chain management.
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The main reason channel partners are motivated to implement IOS’s is their desire to create
additional economic value through the creation of more effective and efficient
interorganizational interactions (Buvik and John 2000; Kumar and van Dissel 1996; Wilson and
Vlosky 1998). Economic value is created through the channel partners’ investments in specific
assets, increased knowledge exchange, the combining of complementary resources and lowered
transaction costs (Dyer and Singh 1998). While economic value is the goal of the IOS
implementation process, it is not a guaranteed outcome, mainly due to the interdependencies of
performance outcomes that are created by the implementation process (Son, Narasimhan and
Riggins 2005).

With an IOS, neither of the channel partners can optimize the benefits of the technology unless
both channel partners assimilate the technological components and reengineer business
processes. The adoption and assimilation of an IOS is the result of a complex and iterative
process of negotiations, commitments and executions of those commitments (Ring and Van de
Ven 1994). It begins with one trading partner’s decision to adopt the technology; this partner
may be the supplier or the retailer, and as such they can be considered the initiator. Those
channel partners who participate in the adoption are considered followers. With the most recent
RFID-based IOS projects, in almost all cases the initiator has been the retailer and the supplier
has been the follower.
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IOS projects carry more risk than internal technology applications for both the initiator and
follower because of the reliance on and lack of control over the trading partner’s behaviors. In
order for the value to be derived from an IOS, both channel partners must adopt and utilize the
technology. This becomes problematic for the organization initiating the technological
enhancement due to the fact that they often have little control over the adoption behaviors of
their partner organization’s and hence limited control in realizing benefits from the technology
(Bello, Lohtia, and Sangtani 2004).

The need to understand the adoption behavior of follower’s is especially crucial as major
retailers, including Wal-mart, Macy’s and JC Penney, and governments attempt to mandate the
adoption and utilization of RFID-based IOS’s. Considering that blanketed mandates, where all
suppliers are given assimilation deadlines or face penalties, have been ineffective in accelerating
the diffusion of the technology, it becomes important to understand what drives the assimilation
process. Mandates are an excise of power and give followers no choice in the matter of adoption
unless they are willing to terminate the relationship and lose the sales revenue generated from the
exchange relationship. Nevertheless, the scalability of the RFID-based IOS allows followers to
choose the degree to which they will adopt the physical components of the technology, ranging
from low level implementation of solely the tags, to higher level implementations that include
the software, hardware and enterprise exchange components that allow the free flow of
information between the channel partners. As a result, the degree of assimilation has varied
greatly across followers. Considering that neither partner can realize the benefits of the RFID
system if the follower doesn’t assimilate and utilize the technology, understanding the variation
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in the assimilation of followers becomes key to understanding how and why interorganizational
systems succeed.

The extant research surrounding IOS adoption and assimilation suggests some rationales for the
variation in the assimilation. In particular, three main categories of antecedents have been shown
to influence assimilation: characteristics of the technology, organization and exchange. The first
stream focuses on the characteristics of the technology, and suggests that the difficulty associated
with adopting and assimilating IOS’s can be attributed to the perceived relative advantage,
compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability (Chwelos, Benbasat and Dexter 2001;
Iacovou, Benbasat and Dexter 1995; O’Callaghan, Kaufmann and Konsynski 1992; Rogers
2003). While this has been the predominate paradigm for analyzing IOS adoption and use,
researchers suggest that technological characteristics alone are limited in their ability to explain
the variance in adoption and assimilation processes (Attewell 1992). The major argument is that
innovation theory only considers knowledge about the technology and ignores the implications
of knowing how to implement and use the technology (Attewell 1992; Fichman and Kemerer
1997).

A second stream of research, which focuses on the characteristics of the organization, represents
the follower’s ability to adopt and implement an IOS. This stream of research suggests that each
organization has a unique endowment of resources that impact its ability to adopt and implement
IOS’s (Kim, Cavusgil and Calantone 2006; Fichman and Kemerer 1997; Piccoli and Ives 2005).
Researchers rely on various theoretical foundations and several “middle-range” theories to
explain the relationship between organizational characteristics and IOS adoption and
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implementation behaviors. Although this stream of research is prolific, some authors suggest
that the theoretical diversity threatens the legitimacy of the research (Benbasat and Zmud 2003).

The third stream of research utilizes characteristics of the exchange to examine the willingness of
a follower to adopt and implement an IOS with the initiator. Considering that an IOS represents a
mechanism for two organizations to vertically coordinate, and vertical coordination is a hybrid
form of governance, there were very few articles that examined how the characteristics of the
exchange influence the extent to which the follower will vertically coordinate through the
adoption and implementation of an IOS (Buvik and John 2000). While there were several
studies that examine the influence of dependence, trust, and power (Hart and Saunders 1998;
Hausman and Stock 2003; Premkumar and Ramamurthy 1995; Wu, Mahajan and
Balasubramanian 2003), there were only a few studies that examined how elements of the
exchange relationship would influence the follower’s willingness to adopt and implement the
technology. Additionally, attention has been paid to the positive influence of specific assets
(Bala and Venkatesh 2007; Corsten and Kumar 2005; Zaheer, and Venkatraman 1994), but little
has been written to explain how technological uncertainty and performance ambiguity impact the
assimilation process.

Though researchers have formulated a general understanding of the assimilation of IOS’s, there
is a need for a richer understanding of the process and its drivers. Traditional models of
diffusion suggest that time and technological characteristics are the greatest predictors of
adoption behaviors (Rogers 2003). However, in mandated situations followers do not have the
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choice to adopt; rather, their choice is whether or not they should retain the business relationship.
Their decision becomes one of channel efficiency.

Essentially, the decision the follower is making is one of acquiescing or not acquiescing to the
new mode of governance that the technology imposes on the exchange relationship. With RFIDbased IOS’s, the technology can provide bilateral behavioral monitoring capabilities for both
channel partners. The extent of this monitoring capability is highly dependent on the level of
RFID component implementation, and while visibility increases with the installation of the
readers, middleware, hardware, and enterprise exchange systems, the level of tagging has the
greatest impact. Initial mandates required tagging at the case and pallet level; however, item
level tagging provides the most granular visibility and has been demonstrated to provide
significant improvements in various supply chain activities (Delen, Hardgrave and Sharda 2007).
At this level, individual items can be tracked at a distance using radio waves, providing real time
tracking of each product as it passes through the supply chain. RFID-based IOS’s provide
newfound visibility into such activities and tasks as stock rotation, out-of-stock management,
reverse logistics management, as well as enhanced visibility for monitoring delivery
verifications, chargebacks and promotional activities. The increase in visibility that the
technology provides represents a change in the structure of the relationship, and as such the
decision to implement the technology becomes more of a governance decision and less of an
adoption decision. As such, theories of efficient contracting, with contracting defined in the
broad sense provided by Heide (1994), can be applied to the phenomena of the assimilation of
IOS’s.
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Three theories of governance, control theory, agency theory and transaction costs analysis, can
provide additional theoretical lenses that might further explain the assimilation of IOS’s. It can
be argued that the implementation of an IOS represents the “purposive organization of activities
and information flows between independent organizations,” (Buvik and John 2000), or in simpler
terms a mechanism that enables vertical coordination between channel partners (Buvik and John
2000; Grover and Saeed 2007; Kumar and van Dissel 1996; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994).
This suggests that the IOS represents a governance structure. The degree of implementation,
which varies across organizations, determines the level of governance that exists within the
relationship. Under this logic, the assimilation of an IOS is similar to joint action in that it is a
hybrid governance structure (Heide 1994). Following the logic of Jaworski (1988) and Jaworski
and MacInnis (1989), the IOS can be seen as a formal control mechanism designed to “increase
the probability that specified plans are implemented properly and desired outcomes are
achieved”. Implementation of the IOS represents a behavior-oriented contract between the
channel partners (Eisenhardt 1989). The two complementary theories suggest that the
assimilation of the IOS will be dependent on elements of the exchange relationship.

PURPOSE OF STUDY
In the adoption literature, researchers have suggested that acquiring the physical components of
the technology does not lead to deployment and use (Fichman and Kemerer 1999), indicating
that there is a distinction between the decision to purchase the technology and the assimilation
activities (Rogers 2003). This research will examine the deployment and utilization of
interorganizational technologies, in the context of RFID systems, which has been referred to as
assimilation (Fichman and Kemerer 1997). RFID-based IOS systems were selected as the
15

context due to relative newness of the technology applications in the retail setting. The
overarching objectives of this research are to (1) create a mediated measure of assimilation, (2)
understand the relational drivers of assimilation, (3) provide a theoretical framework for
examining the influence of the characteristics of the exchange relationship, and (4) determine
how bilateral governance mechanisms moderate the relationship between characteristics
exchange relationship and assimilation.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDY
The model of interorganizational RFID assimilation within channel relationships provides new
insight into the phenomena of IOS assimilation. First, this new perspective on RFID assimilation
contributes to the assimilation stream of literature by providing a higher-order measure of IOS
assimilation. Second, we provide a theoretical framework for examining the relationship between
exchange relationship characteristics and assimilation. Third, we examine how bilateral
governance mechanisms differentially influence the relationship between characteristics of the
exchange and assimilation.

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This manuscript is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive literature review
on the topics of assimilation and governance mechanisms. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual
model, conceptualizations of the constructs and corresponding hypothesis. Chapter 4 discusses
the research design and methodology, as well as how each construct will be measured and data
collection procedures. Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the analyses. Finally, Chapter 6

16

provides the discussion of key contributions, theoretical implications, study limitations and
directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This study focuses on specific characteristics that explain the propensity to assimilate a
mandated IOS. The objective is to examine several major theories that motivate and substantiate
the conceptual model proposed in this study. We review the dominant theories in adoption and
assimilation and then examine relevant theories of governance.

A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE ON ASSIMILATION
Innovation Theory
In a review of empirical research surrounding IOS’s, Robey, Im and Wareham (2008), found that
the majority of the studies rely upon Rogers’ (2003) diffusion of innovation theory. Under this
theoretical lens, innovation is defined as an “idea, practice or object that is perceived as new by
an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers 2003). Adoption occurs as a sequence of events
beginning with awareness of the technology, followed by attitude formation, then a decision to
adopt or reject the technology, and followed by the implementation of the technology (Rogers
2003). Five characteristics of the innovation have been identified as the key to understanding the
variance observed in adoption behaviors (Rogers 2003). Relative advantage describes the degree
to which an adopter perceives that the innovation is better than the idea it will replace (Rogers
2003). Compatibility represents the congruence between the innovation and the existing values,
experience and needs of the adopter. Complexity is the difficulty associated with understanding
and using the technology. Trialability is the extent to which the innovation can be experimented
with on a trial basis (Rogers 2003). And finally, observability is the extent to which the adopter
can observe the results that other have had with the innovation.
18

Of the five characteristics that influence adoption, relative advantage, compatibility and
complexity have the most theoretical evidence supporting their role in explaining IOS adoption.
Research indicates that the more an organization perceives the IOS as having benefits exceeding
the current legacy system, the more likely they are to adopt (Chwelos, Benbasat and Dexter
2001; Iacovou, Benbasat and Dexter 1995; O’Callaghan, Kaufmann and Konsynski 1992). In
regards to complexity, research suggests that the harder the IOS is to understand and use, the
lower the likelihood that the organization will adopt or implement the IOS (Grover 1993; Grover
and Saeed 2007). Research on compatibility suggests that the more consistent the IOS is with
existing organization values, experience and needs, the more likely it will be adopted and
internally and externally diffused (Grover 1993; O’Callaghan, Kaufmann and Konsynski 1992;
Ramamurthy and Premkumar 1995).

Assimilation Framework
Similar to Rogers’ diffusion of innovation theory, the assimilation framework is also concerned
with the mechanisms that drive adoption, although they suggest a far different rational and the
drivers are not as clearly specified. Attewell (1992) introduces the framework and suggests that
the classical diffusion models are less applicable when dealing with complex technologies due to
the fact that it does not consider the abilities of the adopting organizations. Complex
technologies create knowledge barriers for organization that have limited technical knowledge
and know-how which impacts their ability to adopt and implement technologies (Attewell 1992).
The assimilation framework suggests that knowledge barriers are created when organizational
resources are insufficient to the extent that they place burdens on organizational learning
19

(Attewell 1992; Fichman and Kemerer 1997). Organizations are less susceptible to knowledge
barriers when they have resources that encourage organizational learning (Fichman and Kemerer
1997).

Similar to adoption, assimilation of a technology is a process that begins with an organizations
awareness of the technology. Once they are aware of the technology and show an interest in its
applications, the organization will evaluate the technology, and then decide to deploy the
technology within the organization, which is followed by limited then full deployment (Fichman
and Kemerer 1997). In regards to IOS’s, assimilation has been conceptualized and
operationalized in many different manners. Several researchers define assimilation as a process
beginning with the awareness of the technology and ending with its deployment (Fichman and
Kemerer 1997; Rai, Patnayakuni and Patnayakuni 2008). Bala and Venkatesh (2007) define IOS
assimilation as the extent to which the IOS can sustain and facilitate relevant business activities
that become widely deployed and routinized in an organization. Another conceptualization
focuses on the extent of use and the routinization of the use across the organization (Purvis,
Sambamurthy and Zmud 2001).

In the assimilation literature, the driver’s of assimilation have been defined in terms of
organizational resources. These resources must reach a state where the technology can be used
effectively (Fichman and Kemerer 1997). The gap between the current state of resources and the
resources necessary for the assimilation of the technology vary across organizations depending
on the extent which the resources burden organizational learning (Fichman and Kemerer 1997).
The literature identifies several resources that burden organizational learning. Fichman and
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Kemerer (1997) find that the less prior knowledge related to the technology and the less diversity
of knowledge within an organization the less likely the organization is to initiate and sustain the
assimilation of the technology. In this case, when an organization has less prior knowledge it
will be harder to acquire new knowledge and more knowledge must be acquired, resulting in a
large knowledge burden for the organization. Similarly, diversity of knowledge represents an
organization’s ability to relate new information to what is already known (Fichman and Kemerer
1997). Research finds that the less diverse the organization’s knowledge, the lower their ability
to assimilate (Fichman and Kemerer 1997). Several studies have found that IT infrastructure
will positively influence assimilation (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; Rai et al. 2006). IT
infrastructure capabilities represent the gap between the existing IT infrastructure and the
infrastructure changes required for the new technology. A large gap between the existing
infrastructure and the new infrastructure places a burden on organization learning in that it
requires that the organization understand new technical features and specifications.

A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE ON GOVERNANCE
As stated by Heide (1994), “governance is a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing the
initiation, termination and ongoing relationship maintenance between sets of parties.” It includes
the structuring, monitoring and enforcement of exchange relationships and subsumes issues of
channel control (Heide 1994). Three theories germane to channel governance are control theory,
agency theory and transaction cost analysis because they suggest what elements of the
transaction relationship encourage or discourage the implementation and use of RFID-based
IOS’s. While control and agency theories have been utilized primarily in the examination of
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intraorganizational relationships, some researchers have extrapolated the theories to understand
independent channel relationships (Celly and Frazier 1996; Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010).
In essence, the assimilation of the RFID-based IOS represents a decision on the part of the
principal (the supplier) to implement a control system that monitors the agent’s (the retailer’s)
outcomes and behaviors. A high level of assimilation corresponds to a behavioral-control system
that monitors the processes of the agent. Assimilation at low levels represents a decision to
utilize outcome-based control systems. Each of these theories suggests conditions under which
each system is most suitable. Each theory approaches the assimilation problem with different
assumptions and different antecedent variables. As such, it is beneficial to examine the
phenomena under these three lenses. In the following section we compare and integrate the three
theories as they pertain to the assimilation of IOS’s.

Control Theory
Control refers to an organization’s attempts to influence their channel partners behaviors and
activities to achieve desired goals (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Jaworski 1988; Jaworksi and
MacInnis 1989; Jaworksi Stathakipoulos and Krishnan 1993). The procedures that the
organization uses to monitor, evaluate, manage and influence its channel partner during the
lifetime of the exchange are considered the organization’s control system (Anderson and Oliver
1987). These controls are vital to the efficiency of the channel because they influence member
behavior, ideally in a way that enhances value for both channel partners (Anderson and Oliver
1987; Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010). Formal, or unilateral controls, and informal
controls, or bilateral controls, exist within the channel relationship and may operate in solitude or
tandem (Jaworski 1988; Jaworski, Stathakopoulos and Krishnan 1993).
22

Research suggests formal control is executed through two alternative strategies: outcome control
and behavior control (Eisenhardt 1985; Jaworski 1988; Jaworksi and MacInnis 1989; Joshi
2009). Outcome controls represent a minimalistic approach to governing the channel. With
outcome-based control systems the focus is on the straightforward measure of results, such as
sales volume and dollars (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Jaworski 1988). With these systems very
little monitoring and direction is provided to the channel partner. Historically, organizations rely
on outcome-based control systems when behaviors are difficult to measure (Oliver and Anderson
1994). In contrast, behavior controls utilize extensive performance monitoring to direct channel
activities that are expected to achieve channel goals (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Oliver and
Anderson 1994). With these strategies, channel processes (e.g., channel activities such as
execution of promotions, stock rotation, etc.), are monitored and directed. While the behaviors
associated with the channel processes are not direct indicators of the outputs they are expected to
have a strong influence on performance (Oliver and Anderson 1994).

To the extent that formal mechanisms cannot specify and manage all contingencies in a
relationship, bilateral control, which utilize joint action of the exchange partners, can be enacted
(Bello and Gilliland 2002; Heide 1994; Jaworski 1988). Based on the social elements of the
relationship, bilateral governance mechanisms rely on the collaborative efforts of both channel
partners to achieve mutual goals (Heide 1994). Bilateral mechanisms parallel formal controls, in
that they are used to incentivize, monitor and enforce acceptable channel behaviors. However
they evince themselves in less formal, more relationally based way. Bilateral incentives are
based on expectations of fairness over the long-run, even when faced with short term sacrifices
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(Dyer and Singh 1998; Heide 1994). Outcome behaviors are motivated and managed by the
expectation that the relationship will continue into the future and equity will prevail (Heide
1994). Under bilateral governance, monitoring processes are self-enforced and based on the
each organization’s examination of their own investments in light of channel partner
expectations (Heide 1994). Enforcement is based on social norms, where aspects of the
relationship, such as trust and commitment, are relied upon as mechanisms to impose the
informal rules of the relationship (Heide 1994). While there is limited research examining
informal controls, it suggests that bilateral mechanisms positively effect coordination and
negatively impact conflict (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010).

While there is a significant amount of research examining the consequences of control strategies
(see Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy 2005 for a review), research regarding the antecedents is
scarce. Jaworski (1988) suggests that the decision to implement outcome-based control
strategies or behavior-based control strategies is dependent on the macro, operating and internal
environments. Limited research suggests that the environmental variables of uncertainty as well
as the company variables of measurability outcome, and routinization are positively related to the
use of behavior-based controls (Krafft 1999). Eisenhardt (1985) extrapolates on the influence of
the internal environment and finds that the task characteristics influence the choice of control
strategies. In particular she finds that task programmability, which is the degree to which
behaviors can be defined and measured, lends itself to output controls when goals can be clearly
stated and measured. Additional research examines the concept of task characteristics and finds
that procedural knowledge, performance documentation lead to the decision to employ outcome-
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controls (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1993; Jaworski and MacInnis 1989; Jaworski,
Stathaltopoulos and Krishnan 1993; Ramaswami 2002).

In summary, if RFID-based IOS’s are viewed from the perspective of being a mechanism that
enables behavioral-based control, then control theory would suggest the rational for the decision
to assimilate or not assimilate the technology. The theory suggests that internal and external
environmental factors influence the decision to assimilate, with characteristics of the task having
the most empirical support.
Agency Theory
Research surrounding agency theory has been vast in the areas of marketing, economics, finance
organizational behavior. This is not surprising considering that the agency relationship exists in
almost all exchange relationships (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992). In specific, agency theory
encompasses any relationship where one party (the principal) attempts to control the activities of
another party (the agent) to whom the principal has delegated channel activities (Bahli and
Rivard 2003; Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992; Eisenhardt 1985). The theory suggests that
execution of these actions represent a contract between the two parties, which may exist as either
formal, explicit contracts or informal “social contracts” (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992;
Eisenhardt 1985). Determining which type of contracting option is most efficient is the focus of
the theory. The most efficient contract is the decision of the principal and does not guarantee
joint utility maximization for both channel partners.

Two types of agency problems, precontractual and postcontractual, have been identified.
Precontractual problems exist during the initiation stage of an exchange relationship and deal
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with the hazards associated with selecting an exchange partner (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992;
Eisenhardt 1989).

Postcontractual problems manifest themselves during the relationship and

are related to the risks associated with goal incongruency between the principal and agent
(Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992; Eisenhardt 1989). Considering that the decision to participate
in an IOS occurs within an existing principal/agent relationship we will focus on the
postcontractual problem.

Bergen, Dutta and Walker (1992) refer to postcontractual problems as those of “hidden action”
which involve four main assumptions regarding the principal/agent relationship. First, both are
motivated by self-interest, which suggests that the relationship has some degree of goal
incongruence (Anderson and Oliver 1987). Second, the principal has some degree of ambiguity
regarding the actions performed for the principal by the agent (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992;
Eisenhardt 1989). The third assumption considers that uncontrollable environmental factors
make it difficult to contract for all contingencies (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992). Finally, the
agent and principal are expected to have differing risk preferences (Bergen, Dutta and Walker
1992).

The assumptions suggest that the principal and agent are in conflict. Agency theory indicates
that this conflict can be managed with the implementation of an appropriate control system that
motivates both parties to achieve the same outcome (Anderson and Oliver 1987). Similar to
control theory, the principal has two options, one is to implement a behavior-based control
system and the other is to simply measure outcomes (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Challagalla and
Shervani 1997). A behavior-based contract is a form of hierarchical governance, whereas the
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outcome-based contract represents market governance (Eisenhardt 1989; Krafft 1999). With
behavioral-based contracts, the information is in essence purchased and appropriate behaviors
are rewarded (Krafft 1999). Outcome contracts simply rewards the agent based on measured
outputs.

The decision to employ behavior-based versus outcome-based contracts has been shown to be
influenced by several factors. Kraft (1999) found that environmental uncertainty increases the
use of behavioral controls. Additionally, Krafft (1999) found that when output measures were
complete and an adequate measure of performance, then the use of output-contracts was the most
efficient choice. Similarly, Bergen, Dutta and Walker (1992) propose that the more difficult it is
to measure the outcomes of an agent’s task, the greater the efficiency of behavior-based
contracts. They also suggest that as goal conflict increases, outcome-based contracts become the
most efficient choice.

In the manufacturer/retailer relationship, the manufacturer must rely on the retailer to perform
specific activities and tasks that ensure efficient distribution of its products. These tasks and
activities may include promotional, inventory management, and reverse logistic activities to
name a few. A decision to assimilate an IOS represents a new way of managing and evaluating
the performance of the agent in regards to these tasks. In essence, the manufacturer must decide
if the behavioral control afforded by the IOS is the most efficient contract decision.
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Transaction Cost Economics
In contrast to agency and control theories, transaction cost analysis (TCA) suggests that the
decisions surrounding assimilation of an IOS technology are equivalent to the decision to
implement behavioral control system (Anderson and Oliver 1987). This choice is analogous to
the vertical integration decision which is a “hybrid governance” option that lies between the
make or buy decision and are preferable under certain circumstances (Oliver and Anderson
1994). The lack of assimilation represents the decision to utilize an outcome control, which has
been argued to correspond to most closely to market contracting or the decision to “buy”
(Anderson and Oliver 1987).

Transaction cost analysis (TCA) suggests “that organizations select the lowest-cost transaction
structures that effectively protect against partner opportunism, ensure that partners fulfill
contractual obligations and provide a framework for dealing with uncertainties” (Houston and
Johnson 2000). According to TCA, specific assets need to be safeguarded from the opportunistic
behavior of the channel partners, which can be done through appropriate governance structures
(Heide and John 1990). In exchange relationships that have high transaction costs, which are
represented by high degrees of asset specificity and performance ambiguity and low levels of
technological uncertainty, TCA suggests that vertical integration is the optimal governance
structure (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006; Heide and John 1990; Rindfleisch and Heide
1997). However, in cases where vertical integration is cost prohibitive, hybrid forms of
governance, such as joint action, alliances and vertical coordination will be employed rather than
market governance structures (Buvik and John 2000; Heide and John 1990; Johnson and
Houston 2000).
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Transaction specific assets represent specialized investments in human and physical assets that
are a required to support the exchange relationship but cannot be redeployed outside the focal
relationship (Heide and John 1988). Specific assets represent a sunk cost to the organization in
that the value of the assets would be lost if the relationship is terminated (Heide and John 1988;
Heide and John 1990; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Specificity of the assets will vary depending
on the extent to which they can be used with other channel partners or other applications within
the organization (Heide and John 1988). When the assets are less transferable they create
switching costs that expose the follower to exchange hazards. If the follower invests in specific
assets the initiator has the potential to exploit these assets and act opportunistically. For
example, the initiator may take advantage of the follower’s locked-in position by demanding
additional concessions from the follower.

TCA suggests that the more the follower has invested in assets specific to the exchange with the
initiator, the more the follower will try to safeguard those assets by vertically integrating with
their channel partner (Heide and John 1990). In the case of IOS’s, vertical integration is cost
prohibitive, however, increasing the extent to which the two organizations are tied together
through the assimilation of the technology would safeguard their investments. Son, Narasimhan
and Riggins (2005) found in their study of EDI usage that higher levels of asset specificity
increased cooperation between channel members which lead to increased EDI usage in the
relationship. Zaheer and Venkatram (1994) found that business process asset specificity, defined
as the investments in resources that enable the exploitation of an IOS system for business
competencies, increases the degree of electronic integration achieved through the deployment of
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dedicated IOS systems. Additionally, Corsten and Kumar (2005) found that greater levels of
transaction specific investments increased the level of efficient consumer response adoption.

Technological uncertainty is the extent to which the technological requirements of the
relationship are unstable (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006). Technological uncertainty
represents the unpredictable changes in standards or specifications of the technological
components necessary for the exchange relationship (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006).
Contrary to asset specificity and performance ambiguity, relationships that are faced with high
levels of technological uncertainty are best governed by market governance (Geyskens,
Steenkamp and Kumar 2006). Market governance protects organizations from being locked into
obsolete technologies (Heide and John 1990).

While there has been little work in the IOS literature examining the relationship between
technological uncertainty and governance structure, the channels literature provides some
guidance. Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) found that the higher the threat of technological
obsolescence the less likely an organization was to vertically integrate. In a meta-analysis of
transaction cost theory, Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar (2006) support the assertion that
technological uncertainty is best managed with market governance. These studies suggest that
when technological uncertainty is high, followers will be less willing to vertically coordinate and
as such their degree of assimilation will be low.
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
In this chapter a conceptual model is developed that examines the control problems that
influence the assimilation of IOS’s. Additionally, we test for the moderating effects of bilateral
governance mechanism (see Figure 1). IOS researchers suggest that due to the multitude of
explanatory variables that influence assimilation a complete model would be unmanageable
(Grover 1993). Additionally, there is no single theory that can be used to examine the
relationship (Robey, Im and Wareham 2008). As recommended by Robey, Im and Wareham
(2008), we examine assimilation from several theoretical lenses that complement each other.

ASSIMILATION
While most researchers would agree that assimilation refers to the process spanning from
awareness to commitment to widespread deployment, the terminology utilized to examine the
process or subprocesses has limited consistency. Terms such as adoption, implementation,
diffusion, infusion, IT usage and integration all refer to assimilation in some degree. Adoption
and assimilation are in some degree interchangeable terminology that represents the process of
becoming aware, committing to and implementing technological innovations (Fichman and
Kemerer 1997; Rogers 2003). While IOS research has utilized both adoption and assimilation
terminology, it appears that the key differentiating factor between these two distinct terms lies in
the fact that assimilation research focuses predominately in the factors that lead to higher levels
of deployment whereas the majority of adoption research focuses on the factors that influence the
decision to adopt. Terms such as implementation, integration, infusion and diffusion all
converge around the subprocesses of deployment. As our research is an attempt to understand
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what factors influence the extent to which an organization deploys and utilizes an IOS, we
employ the assimilation terminology.

Assimilation has been conceptualized in a multitude of ways. Meyer and Goes (1988) define
assimilation as an “organizational process that is set in motion when (1) individual organization
members first hear of an innovation’s development, (2) can lead to the acquisition of the
innovation and (3) sometimes comes to fruition in the innovations full acceptance, utilization and
institutionalization.” Fichman and Kemerer (1997) conceptualize assimilation in a similar
manner; however they define the assimilation stage as a “combined measure of earliness of
initiation of assimilation activities, speed of assimilation activities and an absence of rejection,
stalling or discontinuance.” They suggest that there are six stages of assimilation awareness,
interest, evaluation/trial, commitment, limited deployment and general deployment. Armstrong
and Sambamurthy (1999) define assimilation as “the success achieved by organizations utilizing
the capabilities of IT effectively in their business activities.” In their examination of the
assimilation of interorganizational business process standards, Bala and Venkatesh (2007) define
assimilation as the “degree to which the IPBS support and enable relevant business activities in
the value chain and become widely deployed and routinized in the organization.” Purvis,
Sambamurthy and Zmud (2001) define assimilation as “the extent to which the use of the
technology diffuses across the organizational projects or work processes and becomes routinized
in the activities of those projects and processes.”

In terms of IOS research, the conceptualizations are limited in several ways. First, the current
conceptualizations are limited in that they assume that deployment of technology automatically
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results in business process changes that are necessary before the technology can be effectively
utilized. As Clark and Stoddard (1996) point out, technology and process innovations are often
interdependent, however they can each be adopted independently. Damanpour (1991) in his
meta-analysis of innovation, made a distinction between technological innovations, described as
the technological products, and administrative innovations, which are the administrative
processes. Others consider integration as the process of altering business practices (Kim,
Cavusgil and Calantone 2005).

Another limitation that must be addressed is in the conceptualization of deployment within the
assimilation framework. Fichman and Kemerer (1997) distinguish between limited deployment
and general deployment. Limited deployment refers to the establishment of a program within the
organization that has been applied to a few uses (Fichman and Kemerer 1997). With general
deployment the program has diffused through the organization and is used on a substantial basis
(Fichman and Kemerer 1997). Rai et al. (2006) further elaborate on this framework by adding
partial deployment which differentiates between minimal and substantial use. While the stage
approach provides a richer measure of assimilation than other measures (e.g., time since
adoption), it is limited in that it does not differentiate the use of the technology from the use of
the information created from the technology. For example, with RFID based IOS’s, one
organization could have 100% usage of the tags, where all product lines utilize the technology
and the application of the tags are routinized across the organization. However, they might not
utilize the readers, middleware or enterprise software components that are necessary to capture
and disseminate the information. In contrast, another organization could have 20% usage of
tags, but also utilize readers, middleware and enterprise software systems that capture and
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disseminate the information. Classifying these organizations into deployment stages would
prove to be difficult.

As such, we suggest that there is a need to reconceptualize assimilation. In line with other
researchers, we suggest that IOS assimilation is multifaceted and includes both the physical
adoption of the technological components and the utilization of the information obtained from
the technology (Clark and Stoddard 1996; Rai et al. 2006). Most IOS technologies are scalable
and the deployment levels vary from a minimalistic approach that may meet a mandate but not
enable information exchange to a full deployment that enables information exchange. The
minimalistic approach represents a decision to use a market or outcome-control mechanism to
govern the relationship. In contrast, a full deployment and utilization represents a highly
sophisticated behavioral monitoring system that provides visibility into the channel activities that
surround new product introductions, the execution of product promotions, responses to out-ofstock situations, stock rotations, charge-back management, order reconciliation, inventory
optimization and reverse logistics. We define IOS assimilation as the degree to which the
organization intends to adopt the IOS technologies that will support and enable relevant business
activities that create value for the organization. We suggest that it is comprised of three
dimensions, technological assimilation, exploitive assimilation and exploritive assimilation.
Additionally, we suggest that exploitive and exploritive assimilation are advanced assimilation
processes that are dependent on the adoption of the technological components of the technology.
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Technological Assimilation
Iacovou, Benbasat and Dexter (1995) and Clark and Stoddard (1996) suggest that there is a
distinction between technological and process assimilation. With IOS’s there are specific
components of the technology that enable information exchange with channel partners. In the
case of RFID-based systems, these include such components as the EPC global subscription,
EPC-IS service, RFID tags, readers, middleware, enterprise exchange software and other
technological components that enable information exchange across organizational boundaries
(Curtin, Kauffman and Riggins 2007; Armenio et al. 2007). Therefore, we define technological
assimilation as the degree to which the organization plans to deploy the physical components of
the technology within the organization (Ramamurthy and Premkumar 1995). This is similar to
the concept of technological connectivity discussed by Fawcett et al. (2007) and the concept of
interfirm system integration presented by Kim, Cavusgil and Calantone (2006).

Exploitive and Exploritive Assimilation
Theories of organizational learning suggest that organizations make resource trade-offs between
gaining new information about alternatives to improve their future standing and using current
information to improve their current situation (March 1991). This trade-off between “the
exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties (March 1991), has been
examined under the contexts of organizational adaptation, competitive advantage, knowledge
sharing, technological innovation and supply chain relationships (Gutpa, Smith and Shalley
2006; Im and Rai 2008; Subramani 2004). Benner and Tushman (2002) examine exploitive and
exploratory innovation as they relate to process management. They define exploitive
innovations as those innovations that “involve improvements in existing components and build
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on the existing technological trajectory, whereas exploratory innovation involves a shift to a
different technological trajectory.” Im and Rai (2008) examine the antecedents and outcomes of
exploratory and exploitative knowledge sharing in interorganizational relationships. They define
exploratory knowledge sharing as the “exchange of knowledge between firms in a long-term
relationship to seek long-run rewards, focusing on the survival of the system as a whole, and
pursuing risk-taking behaviors.” Exploitative knowledge sharing is defined as the “exchange of
knowledge between firms in a long-term relationship to seek short-run rewards, focusing on the
survival of the components of the system and pursuing risk-averse behaviors.” Subramani
(2004) examines supply chain relationships and defines IT use for exploitation as the execution
of structures interfirm processes and IT use for exploration as the execution of unstructured
interfirm processes. The argument is that the IT technology can be used to either improve
existing processes for organizational benefits (cost reduction, process quality improvements,
etc.) or it can be used to create new solutions to current problems that create soft benefits for the
organization (Subramani 2004). Similarly, He and Wong (2004) examine exploitive and
exploitative innovations. They define exploitive innovation as “technological innovation
activities aimed at improving existing product-market domains and exploratory innovation as
technological innovation aimed at entering new product-market domains.” March (1991) states
that “the essence of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing competencies,
technologies and paradigm…The essence of exploration is experimentation with new
alternative.” Researchers suggest that the value of assimilation is in its effective utilization
(Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; Seggie, Kim and Cavusgil 2006).

36

Following this logic, the value of an IOS can be obtained through exploitive and exploritive use
of the technology. We suggest that once the technological components have been purchased and
installed, an organization can use the technology to “exploit old certainties” by employing the
technology to make current processes and activities more effective. In addition, an organization
can “explore new possibilities” by finding new and innovative ways to utilize the technology, in
essence creating new processes that add value to the organization. As such, we define exploitive
assimilation as the degree to which the organization plans to utilize the IOS technology to
redesign its business activities and tasks to achieve drastic improvements in performance and
exploritive assimilation as the degree to which the organization plans to utilize the IOS to
facilitate and support process innovation and transformations that create value for the
organization. Eisenhardt (1985) suggests that the implementation of information systems makes
behavior based control more likely. This suggests that as technological assimilation increases,
their likelihood of using it increases. As such we posit:

H1: The higher the technological assimilation, the higher the
exploitive assimilation
H2: The higher the technological assimilation, the higher the
exploritive assimilation.

EXCHANGE PROBLEMS
Asset Specificity
Asset specificity is defined as the extent to which the follower has invested in assets that are
specific to the relationship with the initiating partner. The more entrenched a follower is in its
investment in its relationship with the initiator, the more costly it becomes to switch customers.
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The higher switching costs motivate the follower to maintain the relationship by increasing the
extent to which it coordinates with the initiator (Son, Narasimhan and Riggins 2005). The basic
tenet of this argument is that a follower attempts to safeguard their investments by engaging in
collaborative efforts that strengthen the bond between the two organizations. In essence, the
assimilation of the technology represents a degree of off-setting investments aimed at reducing
the dependence asymmetry between the channel partners by locking the initiator into the
relationship through the IOS (Heide and John 1988). Son, Narasimhan and Riggins (2005) found
that the more a supplier invested in the specific assets for the relationship as a whole, the more
likely they were to intensify their cooperation with their customer, leading to higher levels of
EDI usage. Corsten and Kumar (2005) found that suppliers will safeguard their previously
unprotected specific investments by increasing their collaborative conduct, such as adopting
efficient consumer response programs, with the retailer. As such, we posit the following:

H3: The higher the asset specificity associated with the exchange
relationship, the higher technological assimilation.

Technological Uncertainty
Prior research indicates that uncertainty in an exchange relationship will influence the choice of
governance structure (Eisenhardt 1989; Rindfleish and Heide 1997). Both TCA and agency
theories posit the influence of uncertainty, however they propose conflicting hypotheses.
Agency theory indicates that high levels of environmental uncertainty reduce a principal’s ability
to preplan and increases the risk within the relationship (Eisenhardt 1989). This risk must be
managed by either transferring it to the agent or managing it within the organization. Outcomebased controls transfers the risk to the agent, whereas behavior controls internalizes the risk and
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is managed by more diligent control mechanisms (Eisenhardt 1989). Anderson and Oliver
(1987) and Celly and Frazier (1996) found that when environmental uncertainty was high,
behavior-based control was the most appropriate choice. In contrast, TCA suggests that
technological uncertainty is best managed with outcome-based controls, or market governance
(Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Adaptation and
information asymmetry problems are created by uncertainty (Heide and John 1990). It has been
argued that the divergence between these two theories lies in the distinct aspects of uncertainty
and that the conflicting results are a result of broad definitions of the construct (Balakrishnan and
Wernerfelt 1986). We follow the logic of TCA and focus on the technological uncertainty that
exists within a channel relationship. As such, we define technological uncertainty as the extent
to which the initiator is unable to accurately forecast the technological requirements of the
relationship (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006). The argument posited suggests that when
the technological requirements of the relationship are in a state of flux, the choice of outcome
controls protects the organization from getting locked-in to an obsolete technology (Balakrishnan
and Wernerfelt 1986). As such we hypothesize the following:

H4: The higher the technological uncertainty associated with the
exchange relationship the lower the technological
assimilation.

AGENCY PROBLEMS
Performance Documentation
In congruence with agency and control theories, the degree of uncertainty, or incomplete
information, is determined by the characteristics of the task. We examine the concept of
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performance documentation, which we define as the extent to which the supplier has available
forms of documentation to assess the retailer’s performance. When accurate measures of
performance exist within the agency relationship, the most efficient contract is based on
outcome-control mechanisms (Jaworksi 1988). In contrast, when the activities and tasks are
difficult to evaluate, behavior-based controls are a more efficient form of governance (Bergan,
Dutta and Walker 1992; Oliver and Anderson 1994). Agarwal and Ramaswami (1993) and
Ramaswami (2002) both find support for this proposition. In their studies, they find that
outcome-based control strategies are more frequently employed when performance
documentation is high. Additionally, Krafft (1999) found that when output measures were
complete and an adequate measure of performance, then the use of output-contracts was the most
efficient choice. In relation to IOS assimilation, it is expected that when an organization has
high levels of performance documentation, they will be less likely to assimilate the technology.
The rational is that the costs of assimilation outweigh the benefits associated with the evaluation
tasks (Eisenhardt 1985).

H5: The more performance documentation that exists to assess
the relationship outcomes, the less likely they are to
assimilate the technology

Agent Orientation

Agency theory assumes that goal conflict and information asymmetry exists within the
relationship and the degree to which they occur will influence the choice of governance
(Eisenhardt 1989; Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992). Agent orientation encompasses both of these
concepts. Agent orientation is defined as the extent to which the follower views the initiator as
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an agent of the organization rather than a customer. High agent orientation indicates that the
follower views the initiator as an agent of the organization. In these cases, the follower expects
that the initiator will execute on specific activities and tasks that result in specific outcomes for
the follower. Considering that both parties are motivated by self-interest and performance
ambiguity exists within the relationship, the follower will select a governance mechanism that is
most efficient for the relationship at hand. In contrast, low agent orientation suggests that the
follower views the initiator as a customer of organization. In these cases, the follower will
acquiesce to requests from initiator. In regards to IOS assimilation, organizations with low agent
orientation will have higher levels of technological assimilation as they acquiesce to the initiator.
As such, we posit:

H6: The lower the agent orientation the more likely they are to
assimilate the technology.

BILATERAL GOVERNANCE
Control and TCA theories address the role of informal controls. In specific, it has been argued
that informal controls operate in tandem with formal controls and may in fact have an interactive
role (Heide 1994; Jaworski 1988; Jaworski, Stathaltopoulos and Krishnan 1993). Informal
controls, also conceptualized as bilateral governance mechanisms, are more relational in nature
in that they rely on the participation of both channel members to collaboratively work together to
achieve mutual goals (Heide 1994). The bilateral governance processes are utilized in the
ongoing maintenance of the interfirm relationship. Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010) identify
three bilateral mechanisms that operate within and exchange relationship.

41

Based on Heide’s (1994) conceptual work, bilateral mechanisms operate in the maintenance
phase and include monitoring, incentive and enforcement mechanisms. Bilateral incentives
reflect the extent to which the expectations that fairness will prevail in the long-run (Heide
1994). Fairness is an incentive in that it represents the expectation that equity will pervade the
relationship (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). Behaviors are managed by the expectation that the
relationship will continue into the future (Heide 1994). Bilateral monitoring is defined as each
organization’s evaluation of its own investments in the relationship to ensure they meet the
expectation of the partner (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010; Heide 1994). Each organization
will self-monitor to ensure that it will achieve the goals share with the channel partner. Bilateral
enforcement refers to the channel partner’s reliance on social norms to maintain compliance with
prior expectations (Gilliland and Bello 2002). When invoked, the enforcement mechanism
utilizes internal elements such as trust and commitment to incite compliance (Heide 1994).

When bilateral mechanisms exist within the exchange relationship, channel partners work
together to achieve common goals. The expectation of joint value creation, rather than selfsatisficing, works to motivate the channel partner collaboration. Researchers contend that the
more bilateral mechanisms that exist within a relationship, the more closely aligned are the
channel members’ goals (Uzzi 1997). Short term inequities are overlooked because of the
expectations that fairness will occur over time (Black 1998; Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach
2010). Additionally, coordination is increased as each party self-monitors its own activities so as
they are in line with channel partner expectations (Ellickson 1987). Strong bonds create social
ties that “impose normative obligations, pressuring organizations to honor agreements and keep
promises” (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010). Research indicates that assimilation of IOS’s
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are influenced by relational depth, specificity and extendibility (Bala and Venkatesh 2007). As
such we posit the following:

H7: The higher the bilateral mechanisms the more likely they
are to assimilate the technology.
H8: The higher the bilateral mechanisms the more likely they are
to exploitively assimilate.
H9: The higher the bilateral mechanisms the more likely they are
to exploritively assimilate.

Bilateral governance mechanisms work within a relationship to manage interorganizational
activities and tasks (Black 1998). The strength of the social mechanism enhances the exchange
relationships ability to accomplish joint goals both directly and indirectly. Bilateral governance
mechanisms work to align the goals of the channel members. Bilateral mechanisms motivate
partners to take positions of inequity in the short term due to the expectations of fairness and the
belief that equity will prevail in the long run (Gibbons 2005). Exchange relationships that are
high in relational norms are better able to manage conflict and reduces opportunism (Brown,
Crosno and Dev 2009; Heide and John 1992; Rokkan, Heide and Wathne 2003). Customersupplier relationships that are high in trust are more likely to utilize interorganizational
technologies to much higher degrees (Hart and Saunders 1998). Thus we expect that bilateral
mechanisms will work to align channel partner goals and enhance the organization’s willingness
to assimilate the technology. As such we propose the following:

H10: Greater bilateral governance strengthens the positive
relationship between asset specificity and technological
assimilation.
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H11: Greater bilateral governance decreases the negative
relationship between technological uncertainty and
technological assimilation.
H12: Greater bilateral governance decreases the negative
relationship between performance documentation and
technological assimilation.
H13: Greater bilateral governance decreases the negative
relationship between agent orientation and technological
assimilation.
H14: Greater bilateral governance strengthens the positive
relationship between technological assimilation and
exploitive assimilation
H15: Greater bilateral governance strengthens the positive
relationship between technological assimilation and
exploritive assimilation.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, we present the research design and methodology that was used to test the
conceptual model. We begin with a description of the measures of this study. Next, we discuss
the sampling and data collection procedures. Finally, we identify the analytical procedures used
to test the conceptual model.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF EXOGENOUS CONSTRUCTS
Exchange Problems
Asset Specificity
Asset specificity is the extent to which the follower has invested in assets that are specific to the
relationship with the initiator. Asset specificity is operationalized as the degree of investments in
equipment, people and processes that are exclusive to and cannot be deployed outside of the
focal relationship. Items are based on the scales from Heide and John (1992) and Joshi and
Stump (1999), and can be seen in Table 2.

Technological Uncertainty
Technological uncertainty is defined as the inability to accurately forecast the technical
requirements of the relationship (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006). Technological
uncertainty is operationalized as the extent to which the technological requirements of the
relationship are unstable. The items are adapted from Narver and Slater (1990) and measure the
degree to which the follower has difficulty predicting and understanding the technology.
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Agency Problems
Performance Documentation
Performance documentation is the extent to which the follower has available forms of
documentation to assess the initiator’s performance of tasks and activities required by the
follower (Jaworski and MacInnis 1989; Jap 2001). Items, adapted by Jap (2001), represent the
degree to which documented information exists that enables the follower to evaluate the initiator
on required activities and tasks.

Agent Orientation
Agent Orientation is defined as the degree to which the follower views the initiator as an agent of
the organization rather than a just a customer. Modified from Narver and Slater’s (1990)
customer orientation scales, agent orientation is operationalized as the degree to which the
follower focuses its business efforts on satisfying the needs of the end-customer rather than the
initiator. These items measure the degree to which the follower’s business objectives, resources
and focus are on the satisfaction of either the follower or the end-customer.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF ENDOGENOUS CONSTRUCTS
Assimilation
Based on the relevant literature we define assimilation as the degree to which the organization
intends to adopt the collaborative technologies that will support and enable relevant business
activities that create value for the organization. We dimensionalize the construct in terms of
technological, exploitive and exploritive assimilation. Considering that our context is RFID
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collaborative technologies and the early stage of adoption of the technology, we measure
assimilation as the propensity to assimilate rather than the actual behavior.

Technological Assimilation
Technological assimilation, modified from Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy (2002),
represents the extent to which the follower agrees to purchase and deploy the technological
components of the collaborative technology within their organization. Before an organization
can deploy and utilize the technology they must first purchase the components. With RFID
technologies these components are scalable, with the adoption of the tags being the most
minimal degree of adoption. These components include the tags, readers, middleware and
enterprise systems that enable the collection of information between organizations.

Exploitive Assimilation
Utilizing the logic of March (1991), RFID technology represents a learning mechanism that can
be used to improve existing organizational activities and tasks. As such, we can define
assimilation as the degree to which the follower plans to utilize the collaborative RFID
technology to redesign its business activities and tasks to achieve drastic improvements in
performance. This conceptualization is similar to Subramani’s (2004) definition of IT use for
exploitation, which is described as the use of IT to improve current structured interfirm processes
that lead to discernable cost reduction and quality increasing benefits. Following McGrath,
(2001) we assess exploitive assimilation by asking respondents the degree to which their
organization would use RFID technologies to monitor their channel partner in the execution of
eight supply chain management tasks: (a) management of new product introductions, (b)
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execution of product promotions, (c) management of out-of-stock situations, (d) rotation of
stock, (e) chargeback management, (f) order reconciliation, (g) inventory optimization, and (c)
reverse logistics management. These items were derived from the literature and field work and
validated by the pilot tests (Boeck and Wamba 2008; Delen, Hardgrave and Sharda 2007;
Hingley, Taylor and Ellis 2007; Lee and Ozer 2007). An index of the construct was created
based on the average of the eight items.

Explorative Assimilation
Exploratative assimilation is defined as the degree to which the organization plans to utilize
RFID to facilitate and support process innovation and transformations that create value for the
organization. Similar to exploitive assimilation, however, rather than focusing on the
improvement of existing processes and activities, the end goal of exploritive assimilation is to
experiment with the technology to create entirely new processes that add value to the
organization (March 1991). The scales were adapted from those used by Auh and Menguc
(2005) and indicate the degree to which the respondent’s organization would use RFID in new
and novel ways to improve the relationship with the initiator.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF MODERATORS AND CONTROL VARIABLE
Bilateral Governance
Bilateral governance represents the bilateral socially-based governing mechanisms that exert
control over the relationship (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010; Heide 1994). These are less
formal governance patterns that utilize social ties as the conduits of behaviors that support the
interorganizational relationship. Following Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010) and Heide
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(1994), bilateral governance is operationalized as the control mechanisms within the relationship
that are manifested as bilateral incentives, bilateral monitoring and bilateral enforcement.

Bilateral incentives
Bilateral incentives reflect the extent to which the expectations that fairness will prevail in the
long-run (Heide 1994). With bilateral incentives, both exchange members work together to
motivate assimilation behaviors. Based on the expectation of fairness, bilateral incentives work
to motivate the follower through the expectation of future gains. Adapted from scales from
Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010), bilateral incentives are measured in terms of the
confidence that both organizations have in the relationship in terms of the distribution of equity.

Bilateral monitoring
Bilateral monitoring, adapted from the scale of Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010), represents
each organization’s evaluation of its own investments in the relationship to ensure they meet the
expectation of their partner (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010; Heide 1994). Bilateral
monitoring is operationalized as the extent to which each party monitor’s its own behavior in an
attempt to appease the other. Items measure the degree to which both organizations assess their
own investments in relationship specific investments, as well as their own intention to continue
the relationship.

Bilateral enforcement
Bilateral enforcement refers to the channel partner’s reliance on social norms to maintain
compliance with prior expectations (Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010; Gilliland and Bello
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2002). Bilateral enforcement is operationalized as the expectation that the shared expectations
and strength of the relationship motivate the enforcement of both formal and informal
agreements. The items, adapted from Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010), include items that
measure the reliance upon relationship strength, collaboration and promise keeping.

Relative Supplier Dependence
Relative supplier dependence, adapted from the scales of Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach (2010),
assesses the degree of comparative reliance of the supplier on the retailer. These items measure
the degree of switching costs, replaceability and dependence of the supplier on the retailer and
the supplier’s perception of the retailer’s dependence on the supplier. The values are derived by
subtracting the supplier’s dependence on the retailer from the retailer’s dependence on the
supplier.

SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTON PROCEDURES
Sampling Plan
The retail industry was selected as an appropriate setting to test the proposed model. In
particular, this study focuses on the suppliers (followers) of retailer’s who are implementing
RFID based collaborative technologies. This industry was selected for the study because it is
characterized by: (1) mandates that require the adoption of the technology as a condition of
future exchanges, and (2) the availability of multiple followers who are most likely to vary in
their assimilation of the technology.
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The sampling frame was derived from two sources. The first source was a customized list
purchased from a top organization specializing in lead generation. The list was web-based and
provided e-mail as well as phone contact information, so we were able to hand-select 3,500
contacts based on the organization they worked for (a manufacturer that sold goods through
retailers) and job titles (marketing managers, key account managers, V.P. of Sales, etc.). The
usable list size was reduced to 3,226 after accounting for insufficient and duplicate contact
information. The following procedure was used to contact each respondent for the final data
collection. Each contact was e-mailed (Appendix A) a request to participate in the study. They
were instructed to respond to the email if they were willing to participate. If they agreed to
participate, an e-mail was sent with the link to the survey (Appendix B).

The second source was a “pay-for-input” online panel managed by a respected market research
organization that specializes in the management and maintenance of online customer panels.
Respondents were limited to marketing and sales managers and executives who worked for
manufacturing organizations. The respondents completed the survey in exchange for a monetary
payment.

Both sample sources were directed to complete the survey via a hyperlink. Screener questions
were then used to filter out inappropriate respondents. These questions included: (1) Does your
organization sell products directly to any retailers (chain drug stores, supermarkets, mass
merchandisers, etc.); (2) Do you have working knowledge of a relationship that your
organization has with any retailer (i.e., do you interact on behalf of your organization with any
retailer). An answer of “no” to either of the questions ended the survey for the respondent.
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After the screener questions, the respondent was asked to respond to the survey based on their
organization’s relationship with a single focal retailer. Following Jap (2001), the focal retailer
was defined as an independent U.S. organization that resells your product. They were told that
the retailer should be one that they interact with on a regular basis; however it does not
necessarily have to be their "most important" or "most favored" retailer, although it can be. This
approach helps ensure that the sample includes varying ranges of values for the antecedents
(Cohen et al. 2002). Additionally, we referred to the focal retailer as “ALPHA” so as to protect
the anonymity of the respondent. The survey began with the assessment of various relational
variables, and then a scenario was introduced. The scenario represented a letter from “ALPHA”
that required the respondents firm to adopt RFID technology. Then they were asked the degree
to which they would participate in the mandate. The survey ended with several demographic
questions. A copy of the final survey can be seen in Appendix C.
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CHAPTER 5: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we describe the data collection procedures, analyses and results of the tests of the
conceptual model. First we describe the questionnaire development and the sample. Then we
discuss the measurement model and its results. Finally, we specify the structural model and
evaluate the hypotheses.

QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT
Field Study
We conducted in-depth interviews with 11 practitioners who were participating in the
assimilation decision making process for their organization. The interviews were conducted at a
well known RFID conference and lasted about thirty to sixty minutes. These individuals
represented a variety of industries (e.g., battery and gift wrap), companies and roles (e.g., VP of
Sales, Marketing Manager, and IT Director). The objective of this stage was to obtain real world
insights into the obstacles that organizations were facing with the assimilation of RFID as well as
identifying the key informant.

The interviews provided several key insights that were used to formulate the research plan. First,
it validated the use of marketing and sales executives as our key informants. These individuals
had extensive interaction with the retailer and were part of the decision making process to adopt
and assimilate collaborative technologies. Second, we realized that there was a problem with
how we were having the respondent identify the focal retailer. The largest or even fourth largest
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retailer would limit the variance we needed in terms our antecedent constructs. Third, we were
better able to understand the assimilation process. Fourth, we were able to identify the relational
variables that were influencing their decision to assimilate the technology. Several informants
spoke of protecting the investments that they had already made in the relationship as well as
technological uncertainty based on past experience with the retailer. To the extent possible, we
integrated the key findings into the research instrument and utilized them to construct the first
version of the questionnaire.

Pre-Test
The primary objectives of the pretest were to purify the measures and validate our key informant
selection. We randomly selected 1,000 contacts from a mailing list of 3,226 that was generated
from Jigsaw.com. Jigsaw.com is a lead generation company that has over 24 million business
contacts. The mailing list was customized and each contact was individually selected based on
their title and the organization they worked for. Specifically, we selected contacts that were in
sales and marketing and worked for organizations which offered products that were available in
retail stores.

An email requesting participation with a link to the study was sent to the contacts from the
survey administrator’s website (Qualtrics.com). Of the 1,000 e-mails sent, 126 respondents
agreed to participate. Of those, 47 were disqualified and 79 were qualified to participate in the
study based on the two screener questions that verified that they (1) worked for manufacturer
that sold directly to retailers and (2) interacted with the retailer on a daily basis. Participation
dropped off to 40 when we asked them to provide the initials of their focal retailer. Due to the
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length and complexity of the survey, missing data was prevalent and only 13 surveys were
competed without missing data.

Several key insights were provided by the pre-test. First, e-mailing directly from our survey
administrator (Qualtrics), provided us with little control and insight as to the true response rate.
We had no way to validate that the e-mail addresses were correct or if they were viewed. From
this we learned that we needed a two step approach to contacting potential respondents. The first
step included sending an e-mail requesting participation. This would allow us to keep track of
bounce backs and allow potential respondents to opt-out of the study all together. In the second
step, we e-mailed those who wished to participate from our Qualtrics account with a link to the
survey. The second insight relates to the dropout rate of almost 50% after asking for the focal
retailer’s initials. This behavior suggests that the respondents did not feel secure in their
anonymity. Going forward we requested that they think of a focal retailer when answering their
questions, however we would refer to this retailer as “ALPHA” in order to protect their
anonymity. Throughout the survey we reminded them that “ALPHA” was the focal retailer that
they originally thought of in the beginning of the survey. Finally, based on the number of
respondents that dropped out in the middle of the survey, we determined that the survey length
was a problem. We utilized the pre-test data to streamline the constructs and reduce the length of
the survey to less than thirty minutes. The final survey can be seen in Appendix B.

The Final Sample
Data for the final study was collected from two sources. The first was derived from the same
customized mailing list used in the pre-test. The list provided e-mail and contact information for
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3,226 hand-selected contacts based on two criteria: (1) the organization they worked for was a
manufacturer that sold goods through a retailer and (2) job titles that included managers and
executives of the sales and marketing departments. 1000 contacts were used for the pre-test,
which left 2,226 remaining contacts. A systematic sampling technique was utilized to select
1,388 contacts from the list. The potential respondents were contacted via e-mail and requested
to participate in the study. For those who wished to participate, an e-mail was sent with a link to
the survey. In order to further qualify the respondents they were asked two questions that
determined whether or not their organization sold products directly through a retailer and if they
had working knowledge of the relationship with any retailers. An answer of “no” to either
question disqualified them from taking the survey.

As seen in Table 3, we were able to get some form of response from 48% of the mailing list.
The response breakdown of the 1,388 contacts includes the following: 687 were non-responders,
338 were non-deliverable due to bounce backs, 166 opted out, 24 were disqualified with the
screener questions, and 173 agreed to participate. The high non-response rate may be attributed
to SPAM filters or job turn-over, however we cannot be sure.

We sent follow up e-mails to those who agreed to participate with a link to the survey. Of the
173 who agreed to participate, 123 completed the survey. Considering the respondents that
opted-out, there were a total of 339 potential respondents, this is a response rate of 36%. We
created a composite score for informant quality by summing the responses. Following Stump
and Heide (1996), respondents who scored less than 12 were discarded (See Table 4). Our final
sample from this source consisted of 120 respondents.
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The second source was a “pay-for-input” online panel managed by a respected market research
organization that specializes in the management and maintenance of online customer panels.
Respondents were limited to marketing and sales managers and executives who worked for
manufacturing organizations. Respondents were further qualified through two questions asking
whether the organization they worked for sold goods directly to any retailer and if they interact
with a retailer on behalf of their organization. The respondents completed the survey in
exchange for a monetary payment.

We received 249 completed questionnaires. 24 surveys were discarded due to insufficient
knowledge. Additionally, we restricted the final sample to include only those who had
completed the survey in above the 25th percentile (approximately 9 minutes). The data was also
reviewed for false open-ended answers and pattern responses. We identified 9 surveys with false
information and 14 with pattern responses, however they all fell below the 25th percentile and
were previously considered for elimination. A total of 190 surveys were retained.

Before combining the data sources, they were examined for statistical differences between the
two groups. Independent sample T-tests indicated that the group’s means did not vary, and thus
we pooled the two data sets together. Between the two sources, there was a total of 310
completed surveys. In order to maximize the quality of the data set, we imposed further
restrictions. Of the 310 completed surveys were removed an additional 51 respondents. We
discarded those respondents which had a survey time in the bottom 25th percentile, or
approximately less than 10 minutes, thus eliminating an additional 21 respondents. Additionally,
we had a 1 page scenario representing a letter from the respondent’s focal retailer. We
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eliminated 30 surveys that were in the bottom 25th percentile in terms of time taken to read the
letter (approximately 15 seconds). A total of 259 usable surveys were obtained for the final
sample. Demographic statistics of the sample can be seen in Table 5.

MEASUREMENT MODEL VALIDATION PROCEDURES
All variables were pre-tested prior to the development of our final survey instrument. Once the
scales were validated the pre-test, the final data was collected. The hypotheses were then tested
using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) in LISREL 8.8 (Joreskog and Sorbom 1993).
Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step process was followed. We first created a measurement
model of all the constructs, then after achieving acceptable fit statistics, the structural model was
tested.

Considering that the responses to the independent and dependent variables are obtained through
the same source, common methods bias is of concern. In order to remedy common methods
bias, we followed Podsakoff et al.’s (2003) recommendations. First, we separated our predictor
and criterion variables within the survey instrument. Second, we carefully constructed our scale
items. Additionally, we tested for common methods bias by utilizing Harmon’s one factor test.

We utilized confirmatory factor analysis to verify unidimensionality of the constructs. This was
done by specifying the observed item to latent variable relationships and allowing the latent
variable constructs to correlate with one another (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Decisions to
drop or retain items were based on Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) recommendations. Several
items were initially dropped based on their inter-item correlations. Three items were used to
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indicate the constructs of asset specificity, technological uncertainty, performance
documentation, agent orientation, bilateral mechanism, supplier relative dependence, and
exploratative assimilation. Four items were used for the construct of technological assimilation.
A single summed index time was used for exploitive assimilation. A total of 26 items and 11
latent constructs were utilized to test the model. The final items used for the measurement
model, along with their means, standard deviations and reliabilities can be found in Table 6.

Specifying the matrix to be used in the estimation of the model is an important issue. We
utilized the covariance matrix, which was calculated by the LISREL 8.8 program after we
provided the correlation matrix and standard deviations, which can be seen in Table 7.
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) technique was used to analyze the covariance matrix.

Due to the nature of our research questions and the complexity of the model, we followed the
direction of Bagozzi and Edwards (1998) and partially aggregated the three bilateral mechanism
constructs (bilateral incentives, bilateral monitoring, and bilateral enforcement) by averaging the
corresponding items used to measure each construct. The composite items were then used as
items for the latent construct “bilateral mechanisms”. We conceptualized bilateral mechanisms
as a higher-order factor comprised of bilateral incentives, bilateral monitoring and bilateral
enforcement. This corresponds with a second-order confirmatory factor model, which the items
are posited to originate from the three first-order factors and the first-order factors originate from
a second-order factor (see Table 8).
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We ran the model with 11 first order constructs and corresponding 26 item measures. For the
single item construct of exploitive assimilation, the path was set to .95 and the error term was set
to .05 (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). For bilateral mechanisms, we followed Bagozzi and
Edwards (1998) and used the composite scores for each of the three higher-order constructs as
individual items.

The model performed well and overall fit statistics suggest that the model is a good fit for the
data. While the χ2 test is significant (χ2(410) = 589.74, p=.00), this is an often a consequence of
samples larger than 200 (Kline 2005). Other measures of overall fit, indicate an acceptable fit
(RMSEA = 0.044; NFI = .95; CFI = .98; SRMR = .045) (Hu and Bentler 1999). The results of
the measurement model can be seen in Table 9.

MAIN EFFECTS: STRUCTURAL MODEL VALIDATON PROCEDURES
We utilized LISREL 8.8 to test our hypothesized structural model. First, we tested the main
effects model at a disaggregated level, utilizing the same 11 constructs and 26 corresponding
items as we did with the measurement model.

The results of the disaggregated main effects model suggest that the hypothesized model is a
relatively good fit for the data (see Table 10). The χ2 is significant (χ2(274) = 418.44, p=.00),
however the other measures indicate an acceptable fit (RMSEA = 0.045; NFI = .95; CFI = .98;
SRMR = .050) and meet Hu and Bentler’s (1999) combination rule for acceptable fit.
Parameter estimates were somewhat consistent with the hypotheses, with seven of the ten main
effects hypotheses supported. Alternative models were examined to determine if the paths
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hypothesized were fully or partially mediated. After examining alternative models to determine
full or partial mediation, a better fitting model was identified. Surprisingly, the best fitting
model freed the path between technological uncertainty and exploritive assimilation, which was
not originally hypothesized. While the χ2 was different (χ2(273) = 406.71, p=.00), the other
measures are similar to the original model (RMSEA = 0.044; NFI = .95; CFI = .98; SRMR =
.047). A χ2 difference test indicates that the models are significantly different and favors the
model with the path freed between technological uncertainty and exploritive assimilation (∆χ2(1)
= 11.73, p = .00). Freeing additional paths did not improve fit statistics, suggesting that
technological assimilation fully mediates the relationship between the antecedents and outcomes.
The fit statistics and parameter estimates for this model can be seen in Table 11. As such, we test
our hypothesized main effects with the alternative model.

We found support for H1, which contends that the more specific assets the supplier has deployed
in the relationship, the more likely they will be to purchase the collaborative technology (β = .20,
t=1.95, p = .05). Regarding H2, there was no support for the effect that technological
uncertainty has on technology assimilation (β = .09, t=1.16, p = .24). However, we did find that
technological uncertainty has a positive direct effect on exploritive assimilation (β = .16, t=3.45,
p = .00). For H3, there was no support and the sign was contrary to our expectations. While we
expected to find that performance documentation would decrease technological assimilation, the
sign was positive and insignificant (β = .11, t=1.53, p = .13). While not significant, the
unexpected sign suggests that the more documentation that exists to assess the initiator’s
performance, the more likely they are to purchase the technological components of the
collaborative technology. We found no support for H4, which focuses on agent orientation

61

decreasing technological assimilation, however the sign is in the appropriate direction (β = -.06,
t= -1.09, p = .28). There is strong support for H5, H6 and H7, which indicates that the more
bilateral mechanisms that exist within the relationship, the more likely the supplier is to
assimilate the collaborative technology (H5: β = .50, t=5.42, p = .00; H6: β = .17, t=2.41, p = .00;
H7: β = .27, t=3.95, p = .00). Hypotheses 8 and 9 suggest that the more a technological
assimilation occurs the higher the exploitive and exploritive assimilation. Both hypotheses are
supported, which indicate that the more technological components are purchased the more likely
the supplier is to utilize the technology to improve efficiency of current processes (H6: β = .55,
t=8.31, p = .00) as well as facilitating innovations that create value for the organization (H7: β =
.57, t=8.66, p = .00).

MODERATING EFFECTS OF BILATERAL MECHANISMS
Due to the complexity and size of the model and sample, as well as our desire to perform tests of
moderation, we utilized a total aggregation model and retested the structural model. We
followed Bagozzi and Edwards (1998) and aggregated the model by creating composites of each
of the constructs. Specifically, the three or four items for each construct were averaged to create
one composite indicator per construct. In this model, 11 constructs were tested with 11
corresponding consolidated items. We then used this aggregated model to test for moderation.

We set the λ paths equal to the square root of the reliability and the error variance to one minus
the reliability and multiplied it by the variance of the scale item. The results of the totally
aggregated model suggest an improved fit, compared with the partially disaggregated model, but
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have similar path estimates. The χ2 is insignificant (χ2(9) = 11.76, p=.22), and the other measures
indicate good fit (RMSEA = 0.034; NFI = .99; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .024). Parameter estimates
can be seen in Table 12 were consistent with the partially disaggregated model. Both models
account for a substantial portion of the variance in technological assimilation (SMC = .42),
exploitive assimilation (SMC = .44) and exploritive assimilation (SMC = .59). Due to the good
fit statistics and parsimonious nature of the aggregated model, we continue our analysis by
testing for moderating effects.

To test for the moderating effects of bilateral mechanisms we followed the recommendations of
Wen, Marsh and Hau (2010) and modeled the latent interactions. This strategy requires the
creation of double mean centered interaction terms, which is a three step process (Wen, Marsh
and Hau 2010). First, we mean centered the independent and moderating variables. Next, we
created a product term by multiplying the mean centered independent and moderator variables.
The last step requires that the product term is mean centered to create the final interaction term
that is used for the analysis. Since we used the totally aggregated model to test moderation, we
had to set the λ paths equal to the square root of the reliability and the error variance to one
minus the reliability and multiplied it by the variance of the scale item. With the interaction
terms the reliability was considered to be the product term of the reliabilities of the independent
and moderator variables used to create the interaction term. We utilized the alternative model
derived from our main effects models to test the hypotheses.

The results of the moderated model suggest that the hypothesized structural model is a relatively
good fit for the data (see Table 13). The χ2 is insignificant (χ2(18) = 21.12, p=.27), and the other
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measures indicate an acceptable fit (RMSEA = 0.026; NFI = .98; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .02) and
meet Hu and Bentler’s (1999) combination rule for acceptable fit. Parameter estimates for the
main effects were similar to the main effects models and can be seen in Table 13 along with the
standard errors, t-values and significance. Additionally, the parameter estimates for the
interaction variables were somewhat consistent with the hypotheses, with support for four of the
six moderation hypotheses.

We found support for H10, which contends that bilateral mechanisms will strengthen the
relationship between asset specificity and technological assimilation (β = .18, t=2.01, p = .06).
A simple slope analysis indicates that the technological assimilation and asset specificity
relationship increases as bilateral mechanisms increase (δTech/δAsset = .27+.18BM).

Regarding H11 and H12, there was no support for the hypothesis that that bilateral mechanisms
weakens the relationship between both technological uncertainty and performance
documentation and technology assimilation (H11: β = -.07, t=-.78, p = .44; H12: β = -.01, t=-.21,
p = .84).

We found support for H13, which suggests that bilateral mechanisms weakens the negative
relationship between agent orientation and technological assimilation (β = .16, t= 2.37, p = .03).
A simple slope analysis indicates that as bilateral mechanisms increase the slope of the
technological assimilation and agent orientation relationship quickly becomes positive
(δTech/δAgent = -0.08+.16BM).
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Additionally we find strong support for H14 and H15, which indicates the bilateral mechanisms
strengthens the relationship between technology assimilation and both exploitive and explorative
assimilation (H14: β = .15, t=2.71, p = .01; H15: β = .12, t=2.36, p = .03). A simple slope
analysis indicates that the positive relationship between exploitive assimilation and technological
assimilation is strengthened by bilateral mechanisms (δExploit/δTech = 0.57+.15BM). A
similar relationship exists between exploritive assimilation and technological assimilation
(δExplore/δTech = 0.57+.15BM).

In order to further understand the interactions, we followed Aiken and West (1991) and further
probed and graphed the interactions. For each interaction, we split the independent variable and
the interaction term into high and low groups, then used general linear modeling to acquire the
means. We then graphed the mean differences to examine the moderating effect. For H10, the
interaction was positive and significant. The analysis (see Figure 2) indicates that the original
positive effect between asset specificity and technological uncertainty is strengthened by
bilateral mechanisms. The main effects indicate that low asset specificity results in lower levels
of assimilation of the technological components. The positive interaction indicates relationships
that exhibit higher levels of bilateral mechanisms, the higher the technological assimilation at
both low and high levels of asset specificity. For H13, the interaction was significant and
positive. However, the main effects model indicated that the relationship between agent
orientation and technological assimilation was negative, albeit insignificant. In this case, the
more the supplier viewed the retailer as an agent for their organization, the less likely they were
to adopt the technology. The analysis (see Figure 3) suggests that when bilateral mechanisms are
high, this effect is diminished and technological assimilation is increased. For H14, the main
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effects relationship between technological assimilation and exploitive assimilation was positive
and significant, as was the interaction. This suggests that the more technological components the
supplier purchases the more likely they were to utilize the technology to improve current
business processes. As seen in Figure 4, with relationships that exhibit high levels of bilateral
mechanisms this effect is intensified, especially when technology assimilation is high. For H15,
the main effects relationship was positive and significant. This indicates that the more
technological assimilation that occurs, the more likely they are to use the technology in
innovative and new ways that add value to the organization. The interaction terms was also
positive and significant and the analysis (see Figure 5) suggests that relationships that exhibit
high levels of bilateral mechanisms are more likely to exploritively assimilate the technology
than those with low levels of bilateral mechanism, this is especially so when high levels of
technological assimilation exist.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Our analysis revealed several key insights. First, the mediated model of assimilation appears to
be a good representation of the key relationships involving assimilation in channel relationships.
Results of the structural equation models indicate a consistency between the hypothesized model
and the data. The confirmatory factor provides evidence for sound measures. The goodness-offit statistics and significant proportions of explained variance both provide support for the
hypothesized structure.

The results signify that variables in the channel relationship influence the assimilation behaviors
of the channel partner who was mandated to adopt the technology. While theory and extant
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literature has demonstrated that the transaction cost and agency theory variables effect decisions
to pursue joint action and behavioral monitoring, these relationships have not been explored in
the context of collaborative technology assimilation. We find that several of these variables are
predictive of assimilation. In particular we found that channel partners who have invested
significant amounts of resources specific to focal relationship are more likely to adopt the
technology. Interestingly, we found the performance documentation relationship to be positive,
which was contrary to expectations. Additionally, the positive relationship between
technological uncertainty and exploritive assimilation was not hypothesized. The positive
moderating effects of bilateral mechanisms indicate the importance of relationalism in the
assimilation process.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS
AND FUTURE RESEARCH

In Chapter 5, the results of the study were described, examining the effects of asset specificity,
technological uncertainty, performance documentation and agent orientation on IOS
assimilation. In this chapter we discuss the theoretical and managerial implications from the
findings. Limitations for the research is examined. Finally, we discuss additional research
questions which may be addressed in future research.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The purpose of this study was to understand the mechanisms of IOS assimilation (i.e., the extent
to which firms deployed and utilized the technology) within channel relationships. A conceptual
model was developed and tested that posits the conditions that are likely to increase or decrease
an organization’s assimilation of an IOS in mandated situations. We theorized that five key
constructs would differentially effect the assimilation of the IOS. It is significant in that it is an
empirically rigorous study of assimilation as it combines the theories surrounding governance.
Additionally, it makes several key contributions to academic literature and managerial practice.
Our results suggest that the relational factors of asset specificity and agent orientation influence
the decision to assimilate an IOS and that existing governance structures (bilateral governance)
play a significant role in accelerating this process.
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Our results indicate that the higher the level of technological component assimilation the more
likely the firm is to utilize the technology to improve current business processes and use it in
innovative ways that add value to the firm. While this seems intuitive, the current streams of
research tend to examine deployment as either a dichotomous decision variable, where you have
either adopted or not adopted the technology (Chwelos, Benbasat and Dexter 2001; Grover 2003;
O’Callaghan, Kaufman and Konsynski 1992). Or as assimilation, which combines the use of the
technology with the implementation of the physical components (Bala and Ventakesh 2007;
Fichman and Kemerer 1997; Rai et al. 2006). Examining assimilation in terms of technological,
exploitive and exploritive provides a richer understanding of the assimilation process.

Our results indicate that exchange relationships that have higher levels of asset specificity have
higher levels of technological assimilation. The assimilation process represents a form of
vertical integration that channel partners use to safeguard these assets (Heide and John 1990).
Firms will assimilate the technology in an attempt to protect the investments that they have
already made in the relationship (Heide and John 1988; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). These
findings are in line with previous research which found that higher levels of asset specificity
increased the deployment and usage of IOS technologies (Corsten and Kumar 2005; Son,
Narasimhan and Riggins 2005; Zaheer and Venkatram 1994).

We did not find support for the relationship between technological uncertainty and technological
assimilation. Additionally, the sign was not as we expected, we had hypothesized a negative
relationship between technological uncertainty and technological assimilation, but the sign, while
insignificant, is positive (β = .09, t=1.16, p = .24). Interestingly, in our alternative model
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analysis, we found that that relationship between technological uncertainty and exploritive
assimilation was significant and positive (β = .16, t=3.45, p = .00). This suggests that
relationships that exhibit more technological uncertainty, where the technological requirements
of the relationship tend to be unstable and quickly become obsolete, the more likely the
following channel partner is to use the technology to improve current business processes. This is
contrary to TCA theories, which would suggest that the following partner would be less likely to
adopt the technology due to the risk associated with the purchase.

We did not find any main effects support for the two agency theory variables, performance
documentation and agent orientation, we proposed. We had expected to find that the more
documentation that existed to measure performance the less likely they were to assimilate the
technology. However, performance documentation was not only insignificant, but the sign was
positive, which is contrary to our hypothesis. This is similar to the findings of Jaworksi,
Stathakopoulos and Krishnan (1993), who had hypothesized that the more complete the
evaluation system, the greater the likelihood that output controls would be utilized, but their
results indicate that the greater the completeness the more likely they were to utilize behavioral
controls. Agent orientation was insignificant, however in the correct direction.

Bilateral mechanisms play an important part in the assimilation of interorganizational
technologies. Bilateral mechanisms represent the informal social controls that exist within the
relationship and serve to align goals and create joint value (Heide 1994; Uzzi 1997). The results
indicate that relationships operate with high levels of bilateral mechanisms are more likely to
assimilate the technology as well as finding ways to explore and exploit its utility. This is an
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important implication, as the value derived from an IOS is highly dependent on the usage of the
technology. Utilizing the technology to improve current business processes or innovate new
businesses processes is crucial to creating value for the system.

Bilateral mechanisms not only directly impact the three assimilation variables, but they also play
a key moderating role. The findings indicate that bilateral mechanisms interact with asset
specificity, agent orientation and technological assimilation. Bilateral mechanisms strengthen
the relationship between asset specificity and technological uncertainty. Channel relationships
that are higher in bilateral mechanisms are more likely to adopt the technology, even when asset
specificity is low. In regards to agent orientation, bilateral mechanisms weaken the negative
relationship between agent orientation and technological assimilation. Firms that view their
channel partner as an agent of their firm rather than just a customer and were in relationships
with low bilateral mechanisms, were less likely to assimilate the technology than those that were
in relationships with high levels of bilateral mechanisms. Bilateral mechanisms also play an
important part in the utilization of the technology. The interaction between bilateral mechanisms
and technological assimilation influences both exploitive and exploritive assimilation. The
results indicate that at low levels of technological assimilation bilateral mechanisms will
minimally increase exploitation and exploration assimilation. However, when technology
assimilation is high, channel relationships high in bilateral mechanisms were much more likely
to exploit and explore the technology.

This study provides empirical evidence that supports the use of governance theories in the
examination of assimilation. It suggests that firms in relationships that are high in asset
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specificity and bilateral mechanisms will be more likely to assimilate the technology as well as
exploit and explore the uses of the technology.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
This study provides empirical support for the importance of studying IOS assimilation under the
lens of governance. The results indicate that factors surrounding the exchange relationship will
influence a follower’s degree of assimilation of an IOS. The three complementary theories of
control theory, agency theory and transaction cost analysis provided a strong theoretical
foundation for the research.

We found that the constructs of asset specificity and technological uncertainty played important
roles in the assimilation process. Asset specificity was a key determinant of technological
assimilation. Technological uncertainty provided interesting findings, insignificant in relation to
technological assimilation, but significant in relation to exploritive assimilation. While this
finding was unexpected, and contrary to theory, it suggests that the higher the risk associated
with the technology the more likely they are to use it to improve current business processes.
This finding tends to be more in line with the agency perspective, as Celly and Frazier (1996)
found, environmental uncertainty was strongly related to the use of behavior-based controls. The
rationale behind this argument is that an emphasis on agent behaviors my reduce riskiness
associated with the relationship. The information that is obtained through exploitive assimilation
of the technology may guard against opportunism, reducing uncertainty for the principal (Celly
and Frazier 1996).
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While the constructs of performance documentation and agent orientation were not significant,
there theoretical justification was strong. Support for task characteristics influencing control
choice is empirically validated through other studies (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1993; Bergan,
Dutta and Walker 1992; Krafft 1999; Oliver and Anderson 1994; Ramaswami 2002). The
findings are rather puzzling and suggest that further investigation into the relationship between
performance documentation and technological assimilation is needed. The level of significance,
(p=.12) suggests that it might be a sample size issue.

Agent orientation did not have a significant main effect, but was shown to interact with bilateral
mechanisms. This construct is similar to customer orientation; however it looks at the degree to
which the firm views the channel partner as an agent of the firm, or a customer. It represents a
type of goal orientation. The findings are significant in that followers that are not socially tied to
their channel partners are less likely to adopt the technology when they view their partner as an
agent of the firm. This finding is noteworthy in that it emphasizes the importance of the informal
controls in agent relationships.

Bilateral mechanisms were the most significant indicator of assimilation. They had a strong
influence on all three aspects of assimilation, technological, exploitive and exploritive, as well as
interactive effects. Agency theory, control theory and TCA all discuss the role of the informal
controls that exist within an exchange relationship. However, there is limited research that
examines what effect they have on the choice of outcome versus behavior-based controls
(Gilliland, Bello and Gundlach 2010; Heide 1994). This research provides further support for
the importance of bilateral governance mechanisms that operate within exchange relationships.

73

MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Our study provides several important implications for industry leaders, executives and members
of standards-development consortia. First, firms that are mandated to participate in an IOS with
a channel partner should be aware that the decision they are making is one of governance more
so than adoption. The decision to continue the relationship and assimilate the technology should
be based on efficient contracts. As such, the benefits of the IOS need to be evaluated in terms of
the efficiency of the behavioral controls that are enabled by the IOS. Rather than focusing on the
technological demands of the initiator, a following firm would be better suited to evaluate the
activities and tasks that the initiator undertakes on their behalf. In almost all retailer-supplier
relationships, there are some channel activities that could possibly benefit from the visibility
provided by an IOS technology. For example, Gillette utilized an RFID-based IOS to track
product replenishment during promotional periods and found that those stores that moved
product from the back room to the store floor prior to the promotion had a 48% increase in
average dollars per point of sale than those who did not. It also identified that 38% of stores
were not executing promotions correctly (Murphy 2005).

Second, with major retailers, such as Wal-mart, moving towards direct-from-manufacturer
relationships and away from middlemen, efficient management of channel activities and tasks
becomes crucial. IOS’s provide bilateral behavioral-control and monitoring for both channel
partners, which increases the efficiency of the channel system. However, this only occurs when
both channel partners assimilate the technology. Therefore understanding the assimilation is
critical to both firm and channel performance. Identifying channel partners who will reap the
most benefits from the new governance system that the IOS creates, has the potential to increase
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the success rate of the IOS system mandated by an initiator. As evidenced by Wal-Mart’s ever
changing RFID-mandate, blanketed mandates are ineffectual at best. This research suggests that
initiating firms would be more successful if they were to identify the channel partners with
whom they have the highest levels of bilateral mechanisms and asset specificity. Those firms
with high levels of relationship specific assets are motivated to participate in IOS’s due to the
sunk costs already invested. Following firms that were in channel relationship with high
expectations of fairness, self-monitoring and social control were much more likely to adopt the
technology than those who weren’t. Additionally, the existence of bilateral mechanisms also
encourages higher levels of utilization of the technology for both current business practices and
innovative uses of the technology.

It is rather intuitive that technological assimilation would lead to higher rates of exploitive and
exploritive assimilation. Interestingly, most of the emphasis from industry leaders and
standards-development consortia focuses on the constructs of compatibility, complexity and
trialability, all derived from the theory of innovation (Rogers 2003). While, the diffusion of
innovations are dependent on the communication of the benefits of a new technology, these
constructs influence the decision to adopt the technology rather than the decision to assimilate
the technology. Our research suggests that with collaborative IOS’s it is also important to focus
on the benefits that the visibility will provide in terms of reducing performance ambiguity and
improving channel efficiency.
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LIMITATIONS
While this study makes some promising contributions to the literature we must note some
limitations. Several trade-offs had to be made over the course of the study, first, we conducted
the research under the setting of retailers and suppliers and focused on one particular IOS
technology—RFID technology. This raises questions of generalizability to other IOS
applications as well as the assimilation of RFID-based IOS’s in other industries. However,
restricting the sample to this context allows us to control for external sources of variation.

The respondents were asked to select a particular retailer that their company sells through.
While this had to be a retailer that the respondent interacted with on a regular basis, it did not
have to be the “most important” or “most favored” retailer. We assumed that the choice of
relationship was randomly distributed across the population and this may have minimal effects
on the results of the study. Additionally, we referred to this retailer as “ALPHA” in order to
maintain the anonymity of the respondent. While we consistently reminded them that “ALPHA”
was the focal firm that they first thought of in the beginning of the survey, we assumed that this
was indeed the case.

Another limitation is that power is not explicitly incorporated into the model, although the
literature indicates its importance in dyadic relationships. We included supplier relative
dependence as a control variable to account for any asymmetry in dependence.

A fourth possible limitation is that we relied on a single key informant. This leads to issues of
key informant competency and differing perspectives among parties in the relationship. The first
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issue was managed through informant quality checks, which revealed that respondents were
knowledgeable and capable to participate. The second issue surrounds common methods bias.
In order to remedy common methods bias, we followed Podsakoff et al.’s (2003)
recommendations. First, we separated our predictor and criterion variables within the survey
instrument. Second, we carefully constructed our scale items. Additionally, we tested for
common methods bias by utilizing Harmon’s one factor test.
Finally, the survey was designed so that respondents were asked to react to a specific scenario
that addressed a mandate to adopt RFID technology. RFID was selected due to the relative
newness of the technology as well as the early adoption stage, where very few firms had actually
adopted the technology. While, all respondents were familiar with the technology, one might
argue that it might have been better to create a fictitious IOS technology in the scenario.

FUTURE RESEARCH
This research examines the assimilation of collaborative IOS’s in channel relationships. It
frames the assimilation decision process in terms of a governance issue, which allows for several
important research directions. First, assimilation is assessed in terms of purchasing the physical
components, as well as assimilating it to improve current business processes and innovate new
business processes. While the technology is necessary for the exploitive and exploritive
assimilation, there might be additional antecedents that differentially influence these assimilation
outcomes. Considering that the value of IOS’s are derived from the capture and dissemination of
information, it is important to understand what encourages exploitive and exploritive
assimilation.
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The results of this research indicate that bilateral mechanisms play an important role in the
assimilation process. However, there are other relational variables that may influence the process
as well. Further research might involve looking at other informal control variables, such as
social norms or relationalism. Additionally, Heide (1994) suggests that unilateral mechanisms
work in tandem with bilateral mechanisms. Future research might include both the bilateral and
unilateral mechanism.

The focus of the study was on the assimilation process and it was outside of our scope to
examine potential outcomes for exploitive and explorative assimilation. While research suggests
that assimilation of IOS’s lead to organizational change, increased firm performance, strategic
benefits and operational benefits, further research might examine how exploitive and exploritive
assimilation influence these benefits.

This research was limited in that it only looked at RFID assimilation in retailer-supplier
relationships. It would be beneficial to see if the conceptual model is generalizable to other
types of relationships, such as manufacturer-supplier, or dealer-manufacturer relationships.
Additionally, IOS’s differ in the extent to which they are scalable and the degree to which they
change the governance structure of the exchange relationship, so research examining additional
IOS’s in channel relationship would be useful.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE 1
Hypothesized Direct and Moderator Effects on Assimilation
Proposed Effect on Assimilation
Hypotheses

Technological
Assimilation

Exploitive
Assimilation

Explorative
Assimilation

+

+

+

+

Strengthen

Strengthen

Mediation Variable
H1/2

Technological Assimilation
Exchange Problem Variables

H3

Asset Specificity

+

H4

Technological Uncertainty

-

Agency Problem Variables
H5

Performance Documentation

-

H6

Agent Orientation

-

Governance Variables
H7/8/9

Bilateral Mechanisms

+

Moderating Variable
H10

Asset SpecificityXBilateral Mechanisms

Strengthen

H11

Technological UncertaintyXBilateral
Mechanisms

Weaken

H12

Performance DocumentationXBilateral
Mechanisms

Weaken

H13

Agent OrientationXBilateral Mechanisms

Weaken

H14/15

Technological AssimilationXBilateral
Mechanisms
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TABLE 2
Response Formats and Items
Scale

Response Anchor

Asset Specificity (AS)

7-point scale: Strongly
disagree/Strongly agree

Technological
Uncertainty (TU)

7-point scale: Strongly
disagree/Strongly agree

Sample Items
1. We have made significant investment in
equipment dedicated to our relationship
with ALPHA .
2. We have many people that are dedicated
exclusively to our relationship with
ALPHA.
3. Our operating process has been tailored
to meet the requirements of dealing with
ALPHA.
1. It is difficult for us to predict what
technological requirements ALPHA will
have for us in the future.
2. ALPHA often expects us to use
technologies that are not well
understood.

3. When ALPHA requires our firm to
purchase new technology, it quickly
becomes obsolete.
Performance
Documentation (PD)

7-point scale: Strongly
disagree/Strongly agree

Agent Orientation (AO)

7-point scale: The
Retailer/Then End
Consumer

Bilateral Mechanisms
(BM)

7-point scale: Strongly
disagree/Strongly agree

1. We have the necessary documented
information to measure ALPHA’s
performance on completed activities.
2. Enough documented information exists
to enable us to evaluate ALPHA’s
activities.
3. We are confident that the documented
information we have is sufficient to
evaluate ALPHA’s performance.
1. Our business objectives are driven
primarily by the satisfaction of …
2. Most of our efforts and resources are
dedicated to…
3. We are more focused on satisfying the
needs of…
Bilateral Incentives:
1. The confidence that any short term
financial inequities will be made up over
time serves as a strong incentive for both
firms to cooperate.
2. The confidence that the financial benefits
will be fair over the long run serves as a
strong incentive for both firms to
cooperate.
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3. The confidence that the investments
made in the relationship today will pay
off over the long run serves as a strong
incentive for both firms to cooperate.
Bilateral Monitoring:
1. Each firm monitors its own investment
of financial resources into the
relationship, to ensure it meets the
expectations of its partner.
2. Each firm monitors the level of
personnel resources it invests into the
relationship, to ensure it meets the
expectations of its partner.
3. Each firm measures its own intention to
make future investments in the
relationship, to ensure it meets the
expectations of its partner.
Bilateral Enforcement:
1. The strength of our relationship will keep
the parties honest in dealing with each
other.
2. We will work together to resolve any
discrepancies that may arise.
3. We will keep our promises to each other
because we value our partnership.

Supplier Relative
Dependence (SRD)

7-point scale: Strongly
disagree/Strongly agree

Supplier Dependence:
1. There are other retailers that could
provide us with comparable
distribution.
2. Our total costs of switching to a
competing retailer would be
prohibitive.
3. It would be difficult for us to replace
the sales and profits ALPHA
generates. (R)
Retailer Dependence:
1. There are other suppliers who could
provide the retailer with comparable
product lines
2. ALPHA would incur minimal costs
in replacing our firm with another
supplier.
3. It would be difficult for ALPHA to
replace the sales and profits
generated from our firm’s product
line. (R)

Technological
Assimilation (TECH)

7-point scale: Strongly
disagree/Strongly agree

1. My organization would purchase all of
the hardware and software (tags and
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readers) necessary to meet the
requirements of ALPHA.
2. My organization would purchase the
technological equipment that would
allow us to filter, manage and store the
data collected.
3. My organization would purchase RFID
components that allow us to share data
with ALPHA.

Exploitive Assimilation
(PLOIT)

7-point scale: No RFID
use/Significant RFID use
(Summed Index)

Explorative
Assimilation (PLORE)

7-point scale: Strongly
disagree/Strongly agree

4. My organization would purchase the
equipment necessary to share the data
across the functional units of my
firm.
Indicate the extent to which your org
would use RFID techno to monitor
ALPHA on the following tasks:
1. Manages our new product
introductions
2. Executes our product promotions
3. Responds to out-of-stock situations
4. Rotates our stock
5. Manages chargebacks to our firm
6. Reconciles our orders
7. Optimizes inventory levels for our
products
8. Manages reverse logistics for our
product.
1. My organization would find new
applications of RFID for process
innovation with ALPHA.
2. My organization would find new ways to
use RFID in working with ALPHA.

3. My organization would utilize RFID
to find new ways to manage our
relationship with ALPHA.
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TABLE 3
Response Rates
Non-response
Non-deliverable (bouncebacks)
Opted-out
Disqualified
Agreed to Participate
Total

687
338

49%
24%

166
24
173
1388

12%
2%
12%
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TABLE 4
Informant Quality Items
Scale
Informant Quality

Response Anchor
7-point scale: 1 = Not
very knowledgeable to
7= Very knowledgeable

Sample Items
How knowledgeable are you about the
following in your organization’s relationship
with ALPHA?
The nature of unique investments and assets
that are used in the relationship
The tasks and activities that ALPHA
performs for your organization
The quality of the relationship with ALPHA
The technological requirements of the
relationship.
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TABLE 5
Descriptive Statistics of Final Sample
Firm Size based on Annual Revenue
Less than $100,000
$100,000 to $500,000
$500,001 to $1,000,000
$1,000,001 to $5,000,000
$5,000,001 to $10,000,000
$10,000,001 to $50,000,000
$50,000,001 to $100,000,000
>$100,000,001

Descriptive Category
Length of Relationship with Focal Retailer (months)
Percent of Sales Accounted for by Retailer
Months in Current Position
Age

Number
5
4
14
24
29
41
28
114

% of Sample
1.9
1.5
5.4
9.3
11.2
15.8
10.8
44

Mean
23.8
23.1%
58.3
47
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TABLE 6
Main Study Measurement Item Properties: Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach’s Alpha
Construct/Items
Asset Specificity
1. We have made significant investment in equipment dedicated to our
relationship with ALPHA .
2. We have many people that are dedicated exclusively to our relationship
with ALPHA.
3. Our operating process has been tailored to meet the requirements of
dealing with ALPHA.
Technological Uncertainty
1. It is difficult for us to predict what technological requirements ALPHA
will have for us in the future.
2. ALPHA often expects us to use technologies that are not well
understood.
3. When ALPHA requires our firm to purchase new technology, it quickly
becomes obsolete.
Performance Documentation
1. We have the necessary documented information to measure ALPHA’s
performance on completed activities.
2. Enough documented information exists to enable us to evaluate
ALPHA’s activities.
3. We are confident that the documented information we have is sufficient
to evaluate ALPHA’s performance.
Agent Orientation
1. Our business objectives are driven primarily by the satisfaction of …
2. Most of our efforts and resources are dedicated to…
3. We are more focused on satisfying the needs of…
Bilateral Mechanisms

Mean
5.17*
5.08

Standard
Deviation
1.38*
1.67

5.06

1.79

5.37

1.43

3.30*
3.85

1.35*
1.61

3.17

1.61

2.88

1.45

5.67*
5.78

1.09*
1.13

5.65

1.21

5.57

1.27

4.33*
4.49
4.10
4.42
5.47*

1.58*
1.85
1.72
1.81
.99*

Alpha

.794

.832

.890

.859
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Bilateral Incentives (average of three items)
1. The confidence that any short term financial inequities will be made up
over time serves as a strong incentive for both firms to cooperate.
2. The confidence that the financial benefits will be fair over the long run
serves as a strong incentive for both firms to cooperate.
3. The confidence that the investments made in the relationship today will
pay off over the long run serves as a strong incentive for both firms to
cooperate.
Bilateral Monitoring (average of three items)
1. Each firm monitors its own investment of financial resources into the
relationship, to ensure it meets the expectations of its partner.
2. Each firm monitors the level of personnel resources it invests into the
relationship, to ensure it meets the expectations of its partner.
3. Each firm measures its own intention to make future investments in the
relationship, to ensure it meets the expectations of its partner.
Bilateral Enforcement(average of three items)
1. The strength of our relationship will keep the parties honest in dealing
with each other.
2. We will work together to resolve any discrepancies that may arise.
3. We will keep our promises to each other because we value our
partnership.
Supplier Relative Dependence
Supplier Dependence – Retailer Dependence
1. There are other retailers (suppliers) that could provide us with
comparable distribution (product lines).
2. Our total costs of switching to a competing retailer (supplier) would be
prohibitive.
3. It would be difficult for us (ALPHA) to replace the sales and profits
ALPHA (we) generates. (R)
Technological Assimilation
1. My organization would purchase all of the hardware and software (tags
and readers) necessary to meet the requirements of ALPHA.
2. My organization would purchase the technological equipment that would

5.22
5.16

1.41
1.52

5.14

1.53

5.37

1.50

5.42*
5.49

1.41*
1.24

5.31

1.32

5.47

1.26

5.78*
5.60

1.01*
1.23

5.87
5.87

1.07
1.13

.30*
-0.23

1.56*
1.88

0.55

1.89

0.57

1.87

4.53*
4.55

1.62*
1.76

4.50

1.71

.927

.929

.859

.770

.954
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allow us to filter, manage and store the data collected.
3. My organization would purchase RFID components that allow us to share
data with ALPHA.
4. My organization would purchase the equipment necessary to share the
data across the functional units of my firm.
Exploitive Assimilation
Indicate the extent to which your org would use RFID techno to monitor ALPHA
on the following tasks:
1. Manages our new product introductions
2. Executes our product promotions
3. Responds to out-of-stock situations
4. Rotates our stock
5. Manages chargebacks to our firm
6. Reconciles our orders
7. Optimizes inventory levels for our products
8. Manages reverse logistics for our product.
Explorative Assimilation
1. My organization would find new applications of RFID for process
innovation with ALPHA.
2. My organization would find new ways to use RFID in working with
ALPHA.
3. My organization would utilize RFID to find new ways to manage our
relationship with ALPHA.
*Means for the Consolidated Scales
**Mean of Summed Scale

4.59

1.69

4.49

1.74

23.10**

14.51**

--

4.30
4.49
4.92
4.24
4.20
4.47
4.79
4.22
4.69*
4.66

2.10
2.11
2.09
2.07
2.20
2.09
2.03
2.00
1.59*
1.68

.951

4.64
4.78

1.67
1.66
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TABLE 7
Item Measures Correlation Matrix with Standard Deviations
Items AS1
AS2
AS3
TU1
TU2
TU3
PD1
PD2
PD3
AO1 AO2 AO3
AS1 1.00
AS2 0.60 1.00
AS3 0.50 0.60 1.00
TU1 0.22 0.23 0.29 1.00
TU2 0.16 0.21 0.28 0.64 1.00
TU3 0.25 0.28 0.23 0.57 0.66 1.00
PD1 0.32 0.27 0.21 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 1.00
PD2 0.24 0.18 0.12 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 0.72 1.00
PD3 0.24 0.22 0.15 -0.08 -0.05 -0.10 0.67 0.80 1.00
AO1 -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 -0.10 -0.15 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 1.00
AO2 -0.14 -0.17 -0.22 -0.10 -0.14 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.58 1.00
AO3 -0.12 -0.19 -0.18 -0.11 -0.18 -0.04 0.10 0.07 -0.01 0.70 0.73 1.00
SRD1 0.02 0.03 0.19 -0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.14 -0.25 -0.22 -0.07 -0.09 -0.06
SRD2 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.10 0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.15 -0.12 -0.18 -0.16 -0.12
SRD3 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.11 -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 -0.25 -0.17 -0.19
BINC1 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.01 -0.09 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.09
BINC2 0.24 0.21 0.24 -0.05 -0.11 0.11 0.14 0.25 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.08
BINC3 0.25 0.24 0.28 -0.02 -0.08 0.05 0.13 0.21 0.18 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03
BMON1 0.26 0.21 0.20 -0.05 -0.14 0.02 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.07 0.02 0.01
BMON2 0.35 0.27 0.27 0.01 -0.11 0.01 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.04 0.03
BMON3 0.35 0.30 0.24 0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.29 0.23 0.24 0.08 0.01 0.04
BENF1 0.21 0.14 0.21 -0.14 -0.14 0.01 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.01
BENF2 0.18 0.13 0.14 -0.15 -0.18 -0.07 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.02 0.05 0.05
BENF3 0.23 0.15 0.17 -0.09 -0.19 -0.08 0.22 0.24 0.20 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
GTECH1 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.21 -0.08 -0.17 -0.16
GTECH2 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.09 0.03 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.21 -0.06 -0.10 -0.09
GTECH3 0.37 0.35 0.41 0.07 0.05 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.20 -0.10 -0.13 -0.15
GTECH4 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.09 0.04 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.23 -0.05 -0.12 -0.07
PLORE1 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.10 0.09 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.04 -0.07 0.01
PLORE2 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.11 0.09 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.18 -0.03 -0.11 -0.05
PLORE3 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.19 -0.02 -0.12 -0.10
1.67 1.79 1.46 1.61 1.61 1.45 1.12 1.21 1.27 1.85 1.71 1.81
St. Devs
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Items SRD1 SRD2 SRD3 BINC1 BINC2 BINC3 BMON1 BMON2 BMON3 BENF1 BENF2 BENF3
SRD1
1.00
SRD2
0.48
1.00
SRD3
0.42
0.68
1.00
BINC1
0.02
0.00 -0.14
1.00
BINC2 -0.03 -0.04 -0.18
0.85
1.00
BINC3
0.01
0.06 -0.07
0.75
0.83
1.00
BMON1 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
0.43
0.43
0.41
1.00
BMON2 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11
0.41
0.45
0.39
0.81
1.00
BMON3 -0.09 -0.07 -0.11
0.43
0.45
0.44
0.80
0.83
1.00
BENF1 -0.07 -0.07 -0.12
0.48
0.51
0.54
0.40
0.43
0.38
1.00
BENF2 -0.13 -0.12 -0.18
0.37
0.45
0.43
0.42
0.41
0.44
0.64
1.00
BENF3 -0.14 -0.10 -0.13
0.39
0.46
0.46
0.44
0.48
0.44
0.65
0.73
1.00
GTECH1
0.11
0.14
0.11
0.36
0.34
0.39
0.36
0.39
0.35
0.33
0.31
0.31
GTECH2
0.09
0.10
0.07
0.40
0.39
0.43
0.33
0.38
0.36
0.31
0.31
0.29
GTECH3
0.08
0.12
0.06
0.41
0.40
0.43
0.31
0.34
0.36
0.33
0.30
0.28
GTECH4
0.05
0.02 -0.04
0.40
0.43
0.42
0.33
0.41
0.39
0.32
0.31
0.28
PLORE1 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11
0.39
0.37
0.38
0.28
0.35
0.34
0.34
0.31
0.32
PLORE2
0.02 -0.04 -0.09
0.44
0.43
0.43
0.27
0.31
0.32
0.35
0.31
0.30
PLORE3
0.00 -0.04 -0.10
0.40
0.38
0.41
0.31
0.32
0.34
0.38
0.32
0.33
1.88
1.89
1.87
1.52
1.53
1.50
1.24
1.32
1.26
1.23
1.07
1.13
St. Devs

Items GTECH1 GTECH2 GTECH3 GTECH4 PLORE1 PLORE2 PLORE3
GTECH1
1.00
GTECH2
0.84
1.00
GTECH3
0.83
0.87
1.00
GTECH4
0.76
0.88
0.86
1.00
PLORE1
0.56
0.63
0.61
0.63
1.00
PLORE2
0.58
0.67
0.65
0.69
0.86
1.00
PLORE3
0.62
0.64
0.67
0.67
0.83
0.90
1.00
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TABLE 8
Bilateral Mechanisms as a Second-Order Factor
Standardized Estimates
A: First-Order Loadings
Indicator
BI1
BI2
BI3
BM1
BM2
BM3
BE1
BE2
BE3

Bilateral Incentives

Bilateral Monitoring

Bilateral Enforcement

a

.88
.97 (23.38)b
.86 (19.33)
.88a
.92 (21.43)
.91 (20.97)
.77a
.84 (13.53)
.86 (13.79)
B: Second-Order Loadings

Bilateral Incentives
Bilateral Monitoring
Bilateral Enforcement
a
Fixed Parameters
b
t-values are in parentheses

a

.73
.67 (8.40)
.76 (8.46)

91

TABLE 9
Main Study Measurement Item Properties: Parameter Estimates, t-values and SMC’s
Construct/Items
Asset Specificity
1. We have made significant investment in equipment dedicated to our
relationship with ALPHA .
2. We have many people that are dedicated exclusively to our relationship
with ALPHA.
3. Our operating process has been tailored to meet the requirements of
dealing with ALPHA.
Technological Uncertainty
1. It is difficult for us to predict what technological requirements ALPHA
will have for us in the future.
2. ALPHA often expects us to use technologies that are not well
understood.
3. When ALPHA requires our firm to purchase new technology, it quickly
becomes obsolete.
Performance Documentation
1. We have the necessary documented information to measure ALPHA’s
performance on completed activities.
2. Enough documented information exists to enable us to evaluate
ALPHA’s activities.
3. We are confident that the documented information we have is sufficient
to evaluate ALPHA’s performance.
Agent Orientation
1. Our business objectives are driven primarily by the satisfaction of …
2. Most of our efforts and resources are dedicated to…
3. We are more focused on satisfying the needs of…
Bilateral Mechanisms

Standardized
Loading

t-value

SMC

.73

--

.53

.79

10.86

.63

.74

10.46

.56

.75

--

.56

.85
.77

11.97
11.48

.73
.59

.78

--

.61

.93

15.58

.86

.86

14.94

.74

.75
.78
.93

-12.62
13.28

.56
.61
.87
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Bilateral Incentives (consolidated)
Bilateral Monitoring (consolidated)
Bilateral Enforcement(consolidated)
Supplier Relative Dependence
Supplier Dependence – Retailer Dependence
1. There are other retailers (suppliers) that could provide us with
comparable distribution (product lines).
2. Our total costs of switching to a competing retailer (supplier) would be
prohibitive.
3. It would be difficult for us (ALPHA) to replace the sales and profits
ALPHA (we) generates. (R)
Technological Assimilation
1. My organization would purchase all of the hardware and software (tags
and readers) necessary to meet the requirements of ALPHA.
2. My organization would purchase the technological equipment that would
allow us to filter, manage and store the data collected.
3. My organization would purchase RFID components that allow us to share
data with ALPHA.
4. My organization would purchase the equipment necessary to share the
data across the functional units of my firm.
Exploitive Assimilation
Explorative Assimilation
1. My organization would find new applications of RFID for process
innovation with ALPHA.
2. My organization would find new ways to use RFID in working with
ALPHA.
3. My organization would utilize RFID to find new ways to manage our
relationship with ALPHA.

.74
.68
.73

-9.47
9.94

.55
.47
.53

.56

--

.31

.84

8.21

.69

.81

8.23

.67

.87

--

.76

.95

23.81

.90

.93

22.70

.86

.92

22.17

.85

1.00

--

1.00

.89

--

.80

.96
.93

26.48
24.54

.93
.87
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TABLE 10
Structural Model: Partially Disaggregated Main Effects Model
Model Parameters
Asset Specificity  Technological Assimilation
Technological Uncertainty  Technological Assimilation
Performance Documentation  Technological Assimilation
Agent Orientation  Technological Assimilation
Bilateral Mechanisms  Technological Assimilation
Bilateral Mechanisms  Exploitive Assimilation
Bilateral Mechanisms  Explorative Assimilation
Technological Assimilation  Exploitive Assimilation
Technological Assimilation  Explorative Assimilation
Control Variable:
Supplier Relative Dependence  Technological Assimilation
Variance Explained
Technological Assimilation
Exploitive Assimilation
Explorative Assimilation

Estimate
.20
.08
.10
-.06
.49
.17
.21
.55
.62

S.E.
0.12
0.09
0.11
0.07
0.13
1.03
0.09
0.09
0.06

T-value
2.06
1.07
1.52
-1.08
5.40
2.40
3.21
8.32
9.57

Sig.
**
ns
ns
ns
***
***
***
***
***

.14

0.10

2.06

**

SMC
.44
.44
.58

Fit Indices
Chi-squared
Degrees of freedom
p-value
SRMR
CFI
RMSEA

418.44
274
0.00
.050
.98
.045

*p<.10
**p<.05
***p<.01
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TABLE 11
Structural Model: Partial Disaggregated Alternative Main Effects Model
Model Parameters
Asset Specificity  Technological Assimilation
Technological Uncertainty  Technological Assimilation
Technological Uncertainty  Explorative Assimilation
Performance Documentation  Technological Assimilation
Agent Orientation  Technological Assimilation
Bilateral Mechanisms  Technological Assimilation
Bilateral Mechanisms  Exploitive Assimilation
Bilateral Mechanisms  Explorative Assimilation
Technological Assimilation  Exploitive Assimilation
Technological Assimilation  Explorative Assimilation
Control Variable:
Supplier Relative Dependence  Technological Assimilation
Variance Explained
Technological Assimilation
Exploitive Assimilation
Explorative Assimilation

Estimate
.19
.09
.16
.10
-.06
.50
.17
.27
.55
.57

S.E.
0.12
0.09
0.06
0.11
0.07
0.14
1.03
0.10
0.53
0.05

T-value
1.95
1.16
3.45
1.53
-1.09
5.42
2.41
3.95
8.31
8.66

Sig.
**
ns
***
ns
ns
***
**
***
***
***

.15

0.10

2.26

**

SMC
.45
.44
.61

Fit Indices
Chi-squared 406.71
Degrees of freedom
273
p-value 0.00
SRMR .047
CFI
.98
RMSEA .044

*p<.10
**p<.05
***p<.01
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TABLE 12
Structural Model: Total Aggregation Model
Model Parameters
Asset Specificity  Technological Assimilation
Technological Uncertainty  Technological Assimilation
Technological Uncertainty  Explorative Assimilation
Performance Documentation  Technological Assimilation
Agent Orientation  Technological Assimilation
Bilateral Mechanisms  Technological Assimilation
Bilateral Mechanisms  Exploitive Assimilation
Bilateral Mechanisms  Explorative Assimilation
Technological Assimilation  Exploitive Assimilation
Technological Assimilation  Explorative Assimilation
Control Variable:
Supplier Relative Dependence  Technological Assimilation
Variance Explained
Technological Assimilation
Exploitive Assimilation
Explorative Assimilation

Estimate
.28
.02
.15
.11
-.05
.40
.13
.21
.59
.61

S.E.
0.11
0.09
0.05
0.10
0.06
0.11
0.91
0.09
0.55
0.05

T-value
3.03
0.31
3.41
1.64
-0.79
5.87
2.12
3.83
10.02
11.22

Sig.
***
ns
***
ns
ns
***
*
***
***
***

.14

0.07

2.09

*

SMC
.42
.44
.59

Fit Indices
Chi-squared
Degrees of freedom
p-value
SRMR
CFI
RMSEA

11.76
9
0.23
.024
1.00
.034

*p<.10
**p<.05
***p<.01

96

TABLE 13
Structural Model: Total Aggregation Moderated Model
Model Parameters
Estimate
Asset Specificity  Technological Assimilation
.27
Technological Uncertainty  Technological Assimilation
.05
.16
Technological Uncertainty  Explorative Assimilation
Performance Documentation  Technological Assimilation
.10
Agent Orientation  Technological Assimilation
-.08
.44
Bilateral Mechanisms  Technological Assimilation
Bilateral Mechanisms  Exploitive Assimilation
.18
.25
Bilateral Mechanisms  Explorative Assimilation
Technological Assimilation  Exploitive Assimilation
.57
Technological Assimilation  Explorative Assimilation
.60
Control Variable:
Supplier Relative Dependence  Technological Assimilation
.11
Moderator Variables:
Asset SpecificityXBilateral Mechanisms Technological Assimilation
.18
Technological UncertaintyXBilateral Mechanisms Technological Assimilation
-.07
Performance DocumentationXBilateral Mechanisms Technological Assimilation
-.01
.16
Agent OrientationXBilateral Mechanisms Technological Assimilation
Technological AssimilationXBilateral Mechanisms Exploitive Assimilation
.15
Technological AssimilationXBilateral Mechanisms Explorative Assimilation
.12
Variance Explained
Technological Assimilation
Exploitive Assimilation
Explorative Assimilation

SMC
.45
.46
.61

S.E.
.12
.10
.05
.10
.06
.13
.97
.09
.55
.05

T-value
2.53
.62
3.50
1.49
-1.27
5.58
2.86
4.32
9.83
11.02

Sig.
**
ns
***
ns
ns
***
***
***
***
***

.07

1.72

*

.10
.10
.10
.07
.49
.05

2.01
-.78
-.21
2.37
2.71
2.36

*
ns
ns
**
***
**

Fit Indices
Chi-squared
df
p-value
SRMR
CFI
RMSEA

21.12
18
.27
.02
1.00
.026

*p<.10
**p<.05
***p<.01
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FIGURE 1
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FIGURE 2
Asset Specificity X Bilateral Mechanisms Interaction

FIGURE 3
Agent Orientation X Bilateral Mechanisms Interaction
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FIGURE 4
Technological Assimilation X Bilateral Mechanisms Interaction
Exploitive Assimilation

Exploratative Assimilation
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Introduction E-mail
SUBJECT: Question from a Doctoral Student from Georgia State University
Hello, from Georgia State University! My name is Jennifer Fries and I am a doctoral student in
the Marketing Department at GSU. I am currently trying to complete my dissertation which
examines the relationship between suppliers and retailers and the effects of collaborative
technologies.
Based on your credentials, I believe that you might be an excellent candidate for participation in
this study. It will only require 20 minutes of your time and I will share a summary of the results
once the study is complete.
The study is being conducted online, so if you would like to participate, please reply to this email
and I will send you a link to the study.
If you would prefer not to participate, then simply respond to this email and I will remove you
from my database.
I hope you will participate. If you have any questions or comments please feel free to contact me
by phone at (404) 413-7685 or via email at jfries@gsu.edu.
Thank you for your time and have a wonderful day!
Jennifer
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APPENDIX B
Study Participation E-mail
Dear XXX,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study. Your opinions are greatly appreciated. It will
only require approximately 20 minutes of your time and in return I will provide you an executive
summary of the findings once the study is complete.
The survey will close on July 15, 2010.
You can participate in the study by accessing the questionnaire online in the following ways:

Follow this link to the Survey:
${l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey}
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:
${l://SurveyURL}
Follow the link to opt out of future emails:
${l://OptOutLink}
If you have any questions about this research you can contact me at 678-360-4856
(jfries@gsu.edu). For additional verification, please feel free to contact my Advisor, Dr. Dan
Bello at 404-413-7658 (dbello@gsu.edu) or Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at
404-413-3513 (svogtner1@gsu.edu).
Thank you for your time and have a wonderful day!
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APPENDIX C
Final Survey Instrument
Thank you for your willingness to share your opinions with us. Your participation in this study
is completely voluntary. If you have any questions at any time regarding this survey you may
contact Jennifer Fries by phone at (404) 413-7685 or by email at mktjlfx@langate.gsu.edu. The
survey should take approximately 20 minutes of your time. Please be aware that you cannot use
the BACK button on your browser. You may start the survey now by clicking on the button
below.

Georgia State University
Department of Marketing
Informed Consent
Principal Investigators: Pam Ellen (PI) Jennifer Fries (Student PI)
I. Purpose:
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to examine how the
relationship between suppliers and retailers influences a supplier’s decision to adopt
collaborative technologies. You are invited to participate because your firm has a direct
relationship with one or more retailers. A total of 300 participants will be recruited for this study.
Participation will require approximately 20 minutes of your time.
II. Procedures:
If you decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire that asks
questions about your organization’s relationship with the retailer. Additionally, you will be
presented with a decision scenario and asked how you expect your organization to respond. The
questionnaire will be online and provided to you via email. No monetary payment will be
provided for participation in this study.
III. Risks:
In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life.
IV. Benefits:
Participation in this study qualifies you for a free executive summary of the results. Overall, we
hope to gain information regarding how the interorganizational relationship influences a
supplier’s decision to adopt technology with a retailer.
V. Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:
Participation in research is voluntary. You have the right not to be in this study. If you decide to
be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip
questions or stop participating at any time. Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits
to which you are otherwise entitled.
VI. Confidentiality:
We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. Pamela Ellen and Jennifer Fries
will have access to the information you provide. Information may also be shared with those who
make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board and the Office for
Human Research Protection (OHRP). We will not use any identifying information on study
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records. The information you provide will be stored on a password-protected computer. Your
name and other facts that might point to you will not appear when we present this study or
publish its results. The findings will be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be
identified personally.
VII. Contact Persons:
Contact Jennifer Fries at mktjlfx@langate.gsu.edu or 770-413-7685 if you have questions about
this study. If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research
study, you may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at 404.413.3513 or
svogtner1@gsu.edu.
VIII. Copy of Consent Form to Subject:
You can print a copy of this consent form to keep.
Does your organization sell products directly to any retailers (chain drug stores, supermarkets,
mass merchandisers, etc)?
 Yes
 No

Do you have working knowledge of a relationship that your firm has with any retailer (i.e., do
you interact on behalf of your firm with any retailer)?
 Yes
 No

Please think of a particular retailer (an independent U.S. organization that resells your product)
that your company sells through. This should be a retailer that you interact with on a regular
basis. The retailer does not necessarily have to be your "most important" or "most favored"
retailer, although it can be. Please answer the following questions, specifically as they relate to
this focal retail customer and your organization's relationship with them. We will refer to this
retailer as "ALPHA." From this point forward when we mention a retailer named “ALPHA”,
please think of the real retailer that you identified here.
How many years has your organization been selling through ALPHA?
______ Number of Years

What percentage of your organization's overall annual sales volume is accounted for by
ALPHA?
______ Percentage of Overall Annual Sales Volume
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How knowledgeable are you about the following in your organization’s relationship with
ALPHA?
Not very
knowledgeable
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
knowledgeable
7





























The quality of the relationship
with ALPHA















The technological requirements
of the relationship















The nature of unique investments
and assets that are used in the
relationship
The tasks and activities that
ALPHA performs for your
organization
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Regarding your organization’s relationship with ALPHA, to what extent do you agree with the
following statements?
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

We have made
significant
investments in
equipment dedicated
to our relationship
with ALPHA.















We have developed
procedures and
routines that are
tailored to ALPHA.















We have many
people that are
dedicated exclusively
to our relationship
with ALPHA.















Our operating
process has been
tailored to meet the
requirements of
dealing with
ALPHA.
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Thinking about the technological requirements that ALPHA has for your organization, please
indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

ALPHA changes the
technology
requirements for the
relationship quite
often.















It is difficult for us to
predict what
technological
requirements
ALPHA will have for
us in the future.















ALPHA often
expects us to use
technologies that are
not well understood.















We never know what
type of technological
changes to expect
from ALPHA.















When ALPHA
requires our firm to
purchase a new
technology, it
quickly becomes
obsolete.















Often the new
technological
requirements from
ALPHA do not
perform as promised.
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Thinking about the documented information that your organization has to evaluate ALPHA's
performance, indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

We have the
necessary documented
information to
measure ALPHA’s
performance on
completed activities.















Enough documented
information exists that
we can evaluate
ALPHA’s activities.















Documents exist to
assess the
performance of most
of ALPHA's
activities.















We are confident that
the documented
information we have
is sufficient to
evaluate ALPHA’s
performance.















108

Please indicate the extent to which ALPHA or the end-consumer is the focus for your
organization for the following statements:
ALPHA
1

2

3

4

5

6

The EndConsumer
7

We mostly monitor and assess our level of
commitment to serving the needs of…















Our business objectives are driven primarily
by the satisfaction of …















Our strategy for competitive advantage is
based primarily on our understanding of the
needs of….















Most of our efforts and resources are
dedicated to…















We are more focused on satisfying the needs
of….
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On the next page we will show you a letter. For the purpose of this exercise, assume that the
letter is from your focal retailer that we are referring to as ALPHA. Please read the letter, then
answer the subsequent questions in terms of how you believe your firm would react.
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Assuming the letter represents a real initiative from your focal retailer, ALPHA, please indicate
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

My organization
would purchase all of
the hardware and
software (tags and
readers) necessary to
meet the requirements
of ALPHA.















My organization
would purchase the
technological
equipment that would
allow us to filter,
manage and store the
data collected.















My organization
would purchase RFID
components that
allow us to share data
with ALPHA.















My organization
would purchase the
equipment necessary
to share the data
across the functional
units of my firm.
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Assuming that the letter represents a real initiative from ALPHA, indicate the extent to which
your organization would use RFID technology to monitor ALPHA on the following tasks. We
would use RFID technology to monitor how ALPHA:
No
RFID
use
1

2

3

4

5

6

Manages our new product introductions
Executes our product promotions





























Responds to out-of-stock situations















Rotates our stock















Manages chargebacks to our firm















Reconciles our orders
Optimizes inventory levels for our products





























Manages reverse logistics for our products















Significant
RFID use
7
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Assuming that the letter represents a real initiative from ALPHA, please indicate the extent to
which you agree or disagree with the following statements:
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

My organization
would use RFID in
new ways that add
value to the
relationship with
ALPHA.















My organization
would find new
applications of RFID
for process innovation
with ALPHA.















My organization
would spend
considerable time and
effort exploring the
potential applications
of RFID in our
relationship with
ALPHA.















My organization
would leverage RFID
to create completely
new business
processes with
ALPHA.











































My organization
would find new ways
to use RFID in
working with
ALPHA.
My organization
would utilize RFID to
find new ways to
manage our
relationship with
ALPHA.
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The next set of questions will ask you about your organization's relationship with your focal
retailer that we are referring to as ALPHA. Please answer all questions as they pertain to your
actual relationship with this real retailer.
For both my firm and ALPHA...
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

The confidence that
any short term
financial inequities
will be made up over
time serves as a
strong incentive for
both firms to
cooperate.















The confidence that
the financial benefits
will be fair over the
long run serves as a
strong incentive for
both firms to
cooperate.















The confidence that
the investments made
in the relationship
today will pay off
over the long run
serves as a strong
incentive for both
firms to cooperate.
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In the relationship with ALPHA, both organizations have...Each organization...
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Each organization
monitors its own
investment of
financial resources
into the relationship,
to ensure it meets the
expectations of its
partner.















Each organization
monitors the level of
personnel resources it
invests into the
relationship, to ensure
it meets the
expectations of its
partner.















Each organization
measures its own
intention to make
future investments in
the relationship, to
ensure it meets the
expectations of its
partner.
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In this relationship, it is expected that...
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Our shared
expectations serve to
enforce our business
agreements.















The strength of our
relationship will keep
the parties honest in
dealing with each
other.















We will work together
to resolve any
discrepancies that
may arise.















We will keep our
promises to each other
because we value our
partnership.
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Regarding your relationship with the ALPHA, to what extent do you agree with the following
statements.
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

There are other
retailers that could
provide us with
comparable
distribution.















Our total costs of
switching to a
competing retailer
would be prohibitive.















It would be difficult
for us to replace the
sales and profits
ALPHA generates.















We are very
dependent on
ALPHA.











































It would be difficult
for ALPHA to replace
the sales and profits
generated from our
firm’s product line.















ALPHA is very
dependent on us.















There are other
suppliers who could
provide ALPHA with
product lines
comparable to ours.
ALPHA would incur
prohibitive costs in
replacing our firm
with another supplier.
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Think back to when you FIRST read the letter from your focal retailer, ALPHA. How believable
is it that ALPHA would propose such an initiative?








Very Believable 1
2
3
4
5
6
Very Unbelievable 7

How many months have you personally interacted with the retailer that we are referring to as
ALPHA?
Approximately, what is the total annual sales revenue of your entire company/organization?









<$100,000
$100,000 to $500,000
$500,001 to $1,000,000
$1,000,001 to $5,000,000
$5,000,001 to $10,000,000
$10,000,001 to $50,000,000
$50,000,001 to $100,000,000
>$100,000,001

What is your current title?
How many MONTHS have you been in your current position?
What is your gender?
 Male
 Female

What year were you born?
That completes our study. Thank you very much for your time. If you would like to receive a
free executive summary of this study, please provide your email address in the space below.
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